THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE CRITICAL THEORY OF R.S. CRANE

AND THE RHETORIC OF FICTION

by

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1971

Date *17 September 1971*

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis
entitled "The Critical Theory of R.S. Crane and The Rhetoric of Fiction"
submitted by Roderick Daniel Derksen in partial fulfilment of the require-
ments for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date *17 September 1971*

ABSTRACT

Chapter I is concerned with the development of the critical theory
of R.S. Crane. The discussion follows the pattern of Crane's own develop-
ment from his attack on the insufficiency of critical principles, to
elucidation and defense of his own neo-aristotelian principles of criti-
cism, to the practical application of these principles. An analysis of
the practical criticism of Maclean and Olson, 'Chicago critics' associated
with Crane, and Crane himself in "The Concept of Plot and the Plot of Tom
Jones", indicates that when the principles Crane expounds are applied to
the work, they lead to serious shortcomings in practical critical judge-
ment. The central question is whether these shortcomings are inherent
in the critical principles applied. With this question in mind the dis-
cussion turns to the practical criticism of Wayne C. Booth in his The
Rhetoric of Fiction.

Chapter II attempts to establish the relationship between the
critical theory of R.S. Crane and the practical criticism of Wayne C.
Booth by introducing as many kinds of evidence as possible. The most
important evidence offered is a brief analysis of The Rhetoric of Fiction
in an attempt to show that Booth's essential critical principles are
derived from Crane.

Chapter III continues with a more comprehensive analysis of the
critical concepts which Booth applies to fiction in an attempt to show
that at each of the four points where Crane fails to adequately apply
his own critical principles to practical judgements, Booth refines these

principles and applies them with a demonstrated responsiveness and sensitivity to the literary work. The value of the neo-aristotelian criticism of R.S. Crane can only be fairly assessed in terms of its complete development and application in The Rhetoric of Fiction.

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INTRODUCTION

The publication of Critics and Criticism (1952) to which Crane
contributed the introduction and four of the twenty articles edited and
the publication of The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry
a year later, an independent work based on the Alexander Lectures given
that year at the University of Toronto, established R.S. Crane as the spokes-
man for a group of 'neo-aristotelian' critics based at the University of
Chicago. The compilation of previously unpublished articles and lectures
which range over his thirty year career in The Idea of the Humanities
(1967) completes Crane's published contributions to literary criticism.
His twenty years as editor of Modern Philology, the recognized publishing
organ of the 'Chicago school' during the 1940's, and his influence as
visiting professor at the University of Toronto, Cornell, Carleton College,
Stanford, Indiana, Florida, Northwestern, New York University, Rochester
and Iowa are as concrete a contribution to the establishment of a 'Chicago
school' of literary criticism, although, by its own nature, more difficult
to access.

The particular characteristic of Crane's critical effort, and
consequently the general tenor of the criticism of the 'Chicago school'
is a primary interest in critical theory and seemingly a secondary interest
in practical criticism. The evident lack of a substantial supportive body
of practical criticism legitimately raises doubts as to the actual value
of Crane's critical theory. Given this perspective, one may infer the

significance of the publication of The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) by Wayne

C. Booth: The Rhetoric of Fiction has been identified as the most signifi-

cant demonstration of the Chicago method.

I propose to evaluate the critical achievement of R.S. Crane first,

by analyzing the theoretical framework developed in Critics and Criticism,

The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry and The Idea of the

Humanities and second, by assessing the practical demonstration of these

theories in The Rhetoric of Fiction by Wayne C. Booth. Three necessary

steps are implied: first, the evaluation of R.S. Crane's critical theory,

second, the definition of the relationship between Crane's critical theory

and Booth's practical criticism, and third, the evaluation of Booth's

practical criticism.

CHAPTER I

THE CRITICAL THEORY OF R.S. CRANE

In his article "Problems for the Modern Critic of Literature,"
Yvor Winters observes that Crane "seems in brief to have come to poetry
through an interest in criticism rather than to criticism through an
interest in poetry."[1] The observation is a fruitful one for two reasons:
first, it identifies the peculiar academic flavour of Crane's criticism;
second, and more important, it suggests an approach to the understanding
of Crane's critical stance. Such an approach begins not with his practical
criticism, nor with elucidation and analysis of his critical methodology,
but with Crane's criticism of critics. There are two reasons why I think
this approach to Crane is sound: first, this approach follows the pattern
of the development of Crane's thought; second, there is no essential
difference between Crane's polemic against modern critics and his adap-
tation of Aristotle's critical principles.

Crane's first important critical essay "History versus Criticism
in the Study of Literature" in the English Journal (1935),[2] marked a
revolution in the sphere of the American University. John Livingstone
Lowes had fired the first shot of the revolution in his presidential
address before the Modern Language Association in December 1933 by
declaring "... the ultimate end of our research is criticism, in the
fullest sense of an often misused word",[3] but in John Crowe Ransom's
opinion, Crane's essay marked the actual change in the American university.

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In his article "Criticism, Inc." Ransom wrote that if criticism should get

a hearing in the universities "... the credit would probably belong to

Professor Ronald S. Crane ... more than any other man. He is the first of

the great professors to have advocated it as a major policy for departments

of English".[4]

Crane's essay drew a clear line between literary history and literary

criticism. He argued that the cherished assumption of graduate English depart-

ments, namely, that "... most if not all of their researches in literary history

can be defended not as history merely, but also as a 'fundamental prerequisite'

of criticism" (Humanities, II, 18), could not be defended because the informa-

tion given about the art of literature was "... exclusively and necessarily

about its accidental characteristics" (Humanities, II, 8). Crane contended:

The literary historian as historian is interested in individual literary
productions only insofar as they can be treated (1) as manifestations of
the special characteristic which is undergoing change or (2) as 'events'
or sources of influence helping to account for the change. And in either
case he is less concerned with exhibiting those combinations of traits
which define, however far from exhaustively, the individuality of a work
than in tracing in it the reflections of common techniques or traditions
of thought. (Humanities, II, 11)

The necessary corrective is literary criticism. According to

Crane literary criticism constitutes "... any reasoned discourse con-

cerning works of imaginative literature the statements in which are

primarily statements about the works themselves and appropriate to their

character as productions of art" (Humanities, II, 11). The essential

difference between literary history and literary criticism is clearly

the kind of understanding about a work of art which one might seek. If

one desires understanding as to why an author said what he said (in a

genetic or historical sense), then the principles of literary history

are applicable, but if one desires understanding as to what an author

said and his reasons for saying it (in the sense of its artistic rational)

then only the principles of literary criticism are applicable. Clearly,

literary history may be justified on the same grounds as all other histories,

as a contribution to cultural understanding, but literary criticism must

seek other justification for its existence within the university. For

Crane, its justification is its humanistic value.

> Such a program ... [would aim at] discriminating enjoyment and evaluation;
> and its discipline would lie ... in the discovery and application of
> principles and the cultivation of sensitivity to literary texts. Its
> products ... would be good judges of literature and not merely learned
> men; and its peculiar value would be measured by the extent to which
> it helped to conserve, in the midst of a university dominated by science
> and history, the proper interests of art. (Humanities, II, 18-19)

The principles of Crane's radical break with the academic traditions

of the English departments of the American universities is evident. Liter-

ary criticism (as defined by Crane) may be justified as contributing to

a particular humanistic end, but the actual academic practise of literary

criticism, studies more accurately designated as literary history, did

not contribute to this particular end because the methods of literary

history contradict the major premise upon which literary criticism (again,

as Crane defines it) is based. The literary critic is committed to the

individuality of the literary work; he therefore limits his statements

to statements about the works themselves, appropriate to their character

as productions of art. The literary historian violates the individuality

of a literary work by considering it as something other than a pure

artistic event, for example, as evidence of the personal attitudes of

its author, or as a reflection of the philosophical interests of his age.

Given the perspective of Crane's total career as scholar and

critic, his break with the academic traditions of the study of literary

history is not as abrupt as the essay "History versus Criticism" may suggest.

The argument of this essay is carefully qualified in Crane's introduction

to Critics and Criticism:

We cannot infer the 'poetic' nature or value of any artistic whole from
its antecedents in the poet's life or in contemporary or earlier culture;
but, having determined critically what the poem is in itself, we can
replace it in its setting of events and other writings and eventually
develop a history of poetry in terms of the interaction of artistic and
extra-artistic causes of change.[5]

Again from a paper read at Carleton College a year after Critics and

Criticism was published, but not published until 1967 in The Idea of

Humanities, Crane speaks of the proper study of literary history:

The better way is to try to build up informally and bit by bit, through
our discussions of particular authors and texts, first of all a grasp
of essential chronology; then what I should call a sense of period
styles (by which I mean an ability to infer from the internal charac-
teristics of texts, without other aids, the generation in which they
must have been written); and finally a habit of asking questions about
works that will yield such information concerning their occasions, their
sources or models, the philosophic 'commonplaces' or artistic conventions
they use, and the traditions they carry on, as will directly promote our
students' understanding and appreciation of them in their aspect as
permanently valuable works of art produced at a given time. (Humanities,
II, 187)

The principles of such a literary history in progress in 1953 was

completed and published in The Idea of the Humanities in 1967 under the

title essay "The Critical and Historical Principles of Literary History"

(Humanities, II, 45-156). The historical and critical principle behind

Crane's criticism of the character of literary criticism in the American

university during the 1930's and his own distinct contributions to literary

history is the same one, namely:

... although the criticism of qualities and the investigation of historical
origins and significances may achieve important results independently of
the criticism of forms, as the past history of practical criticism and
literary scholarship shows, both of these modes of judging literary produc-
tions would gain considerably in rigor and scope if they were founded on,

and hence controlled by, a prior analysis of works from the point of view
of their peculiar principles of construction .... We should then, perhaps,
have ... fewer literary histories in which the achievements of authors
are discussed exclusively in terms of materials and techniques without
reference to the formal ends that helped to determine how these were
used. (Critics, 647)

Two particular essays by Crane "Suggestions Toward a Genealogy of the 'Man

of Feeling'" (Humanities, I, 188-213) and "The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and

the History of Ideas" (Humanities, II, 261-82), among the best of his

limited practical criticism, demonstrate the possibilities of this kind

of historical literary criticism.

An important footnote to Crane's essay, "History versus Criticism"

is found in this introduction to Critics and Criticism:

They [the contributers to this volume] have taken it for granted that
the advancement of the humanities entails giving much more respectful
attention to criticism than has been accorded it, in most centers of
higher learning, during the last half century. (Critics, 5)

This comment is followed by a footnote reference to the essay, "History

versus Criticism". The principle of Crane's criticism of the study of

literature in the American university prior to the late 1930's, that

literary criticism as a discipline that respects the unique quality of

literature as art contributes significantly to humanistic learning, defines

the general humanistic purpose behind the critical effort of the 'Chicago

school'.

In consideration of the larger problem of how the humanities may

be brought to play a more fruitful role in society, Crane proposes a

distinctly critical program, namely, the scrutiny of the powers and

limitations of critical systems currently employed with an eye to (a)

encouraging studies which do not divide the studies of the humanities

into areas of specialization, nor impose architectonic structure of

'integrated' study and (b) qualitatively improving "the sufficiency of principles and devices in vogue ... to its full discovery of values that lie within its scope" (Critics, 4).

The full statement of Crane's faith as a humanist is given in the title essay to his two volume work The Idea of the Humanities and Other Essays. The principle of humanistic education upon which Crane builds is the assumption that "we can become educated men and women only by contemplating, in our youth, and learning the arts by which we may understand and emulate, the best achievements of which men have been capable, in sciences, institutions, and arts" (Humanities, I, 15). Owen Jenkins in his review of Humanities, "Every Man His Own Critic", shows that the question of the humanities and their proper place in Western culture is, for Crane, a historical question.[6] Crane's historical survey, "Shifting Definitions and Evaluations of the Humanities from the Renaissance to the Present", demonstrates that all modern discussions of the humanities have drawn unconsciously on the Roman utilitarian spirit. Crane argues further that understanding this will liberate us from the uncritical acceptance of the traditional formulation of ideas of the humanities "primarily as means to lofty or valuable ends beyond the studies themselves" (Humanities, I, 163) and will enable us to emulate consciously and critically the Greeks who, while they "did not talk about the humanities as such" did formulate "devices for dealing with human accomplishments in the arts and sciences which were at once humanistic in their concern with the criteria of excellence, and philosophical in the manner of their statement and derivation" (I, 157). On this basis Crane challenges "that most fashionable of current commonplaces, the

assumption that there is a necessary opposition between general education, the education we ought to give every man, and special or technical education" (II, 197). The ideal student in any discipline is the man "equipped to be, in a sensible way, his own critic" (II, 194).

Although it was not published until 1949 (Ethics, January 1949)[7] Crane's essay on I.A. Richards, simply entitled, "I.A. Richards and the Art of Interpretation", was written ten years earlier; therefore is the second of the three major critical essays in which we can trace the development of Crane's critical thought.

Crane's approach to Richards is to analyze Richards' postulates of the right method of inquiry into "both the meaning of texts and the meaning of the meaning of texts" and "the necessary consequences of the application of this method to the problems it allows or compels us to pose" (Critics, 27). Implicit in Crane's approach to Richards is the notion that the value of any critical system is the kind of questions it allows or excludes according to its conception of the nature of the artistic fact and its particular procedures necessarily dictated by this prior conception. This is the principle upon which the whole argument of The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry, the conception of the multiplicity of critical languages and the pluralistic and instrumental view of criticism derived from this conception, is based.

Crane argues that Richards conceives of all language in terms of one unifying principle, the dictum that "Thinking is radically metaphoric" (Critics, 27): therefore, to think of the interpretation of discourse (of poetic or scientific discourse itself and of language in general) "... is to think in terms of some fundamental analogy or

context" (Critics, 28). All words, as individual signs are defined by
analogy; that is, they are defined "in terms of their reference to objects
or in terms of the effects in emotion and attitude which the reference
produces" (Critics, 30). Poetic language may be distinguished from other
language (that is, from scientific language) in that it refers to the
effects in emotion and attitude which the reference produces, rather than
to the referred object, the thing 'pointed out'. But words function as
more than 'individual signs'; they function in 'word groupings' or dis-
course, and from this fact springs the central problem of interpretation.
The meaning of a word as an individual sign is determined by the 'context'
of the word, that is, the past series of events which determine the meaning
by the principle of analogy, but the 'meaning of meaning', that is, the
meaning of a word within a word grouping, is determined (also by the
principle of analogous thinking) by the 'particular context' or 'setting',
that is, by the words which function together as discourse. It is this
difference between 'context' and 'setting' and the constant 'rivalry'
between them which determines the 'meaning of meaning'. The inherent
structure of language which determines 'the meaning of meaning' may be
identified:

The different contexts or types of context which supply the meaning for
a single utterance are in constant rivalry with one another, with the
result that we should 'expect ambiguity to the widest extent and of the
subtlest kinds everywhere....' (Critics, 31)

According to Crane, having determined the nature of language,
metaphor, and the purposes of language, reference, Richards is able to
determine the inherent structure of language, ambiguity, or the principle
of the "interinanimation of contexts" (Critics, 32), the single quality

upon which all significances, both scientific and poetic discourse, depend . Scientific discourse is differentiated from poetic discourse on this basis: scientific discourse is characterized by its impersonal and neutral quality in which words point to things and in which all contexts (past and present) are stable, while poetic discourse is characterized by language which expresses or evokes states of feeling, its efficacy being dependent upon the 'qualified likeness' or rivalry between 'context' and 'setting'.

Crane's first disagreement is with the method by which Richards determines the nature of poetry. Crane argues that given the three constituent elements of language, "the words in which texts are composed, the ideas or thoughts they symbolize, and the 'real' things or events to which their words and statements refer" (Critics, 35-6) one may distinguish two principles of organizing these elements: "... on the one hand to mark off sharp distinctions of meaning so that no one distinguishable aspect of an object is resolved into anything else, or, on the other hand, to make possible a reduction of such distinctions in the interest of a single unified truth...." (Critics, 36). Clearly, Richards has chosen the second method. The choice is obviously inevitable, but once the choice of method has been made it just as inevitably "entails consequences which, if the resulting analysis is self-consistent, must be expected to manifest themselves even in the least details of the system" (Critics, 36). The procedure has this limiting effect, that what the critic looks for -- consequently the basis of his evaluation of a poem -- is a single trait or characteristic determined dialectically from the premise which is his unifying principle:

For the Richardsian interpreter of discourse there can be only one problem; and, whether that problem is stated generally as the interaction of contexts and settings or is specified as ambiguity or metaphor or confusion of statement and definition, it is clearly one which <u>can be adequately posed and solved in terms of isolated statements considered apart from the total artistic or logical structure of the works in which they appear.</u> (<u>Critics</u>, 42,   italics mine)

The kinds of criticism which isolates the discussion of technique from the total artistic or logical structure of the works in which they appear is not suited to deal with specific questions of structure like of what principles the words or sentences are ordered in this or that passage, or why the parts of the argument are arranged as they are, or how we may account for the author's insistence on certain aspects of his problem and his neglect of other aspects. These kind of questions are excluded according to Richards' conception of the artistic fact and its particular procedures necessarily dictated by this prior conception. For Richards, structure is inherent in the language; therefore the question of the particularities of structure, a discussion of a work in terms of intention or method (that is, means rationally adopted by the author and directed toward a particular end) are excluded. Implicit in Crane's analysis of Richards' failure is the assertion of the value of these kinds of questions.

The last and most complete in the series of three essays in which we can trace the development of Crane's critical thought is his polemic against Cleanth Brooks and the 'new criticism', an essay entitled "The Critical Monism of Cleanth Brooks", which appeared in <u>Modern Philology</u>, May 1948.[8] As was the case with the essay on Richards, Crane's attack goes beyond the particular thesis advanced by Brooks in "Irony and 'Ironic' Poetry" (<u>College English</u>, IX (1948), 231-37) and <u>The Well Wrought Urn</u>

(New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947) to the "tacit assumptions about critical theory and method" (Critics, 83) which have made the questions debated by Brooks so important.

The climactic point of Brooks' analysis in The Well Wrought Urn is the conclusion that

One of the critical discoveries of our time -- perhaps not a discovery but merely a recovery -- is that the parts of a poem have an organic relation to each other... [it is] this general concept of organic structure which has been revolutionary in our recent criticism; our best 'practical criticism' has been based upon it;...." (The Well Wrought Urn, 231-32, 237, cited in Critics, 84)

Although Brooks demonstrates laudable principles of practical criticism which are implicit in this general critical concept, namely, the consideration of poetry as poetry 'and not another thing', and the shift in critical emphasis from the discussion of generalities about authors to particularized structures of texts (Critics, 83), Crane argues that the concept of organic structure, as derived by Brooks from Coleridge's principle of the nature of poetry, is inadequate.

Essentially, according to Crane, Brooks retains these two propositions of Coleridge: "the proposition that the 'imagination' reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite and discordant qualities; and the proposition that the contrary of poetry is science" (Critics, 89). But, Crane argues, whereas Coleridge makes a distinction between 'poetry' as a synthesis of opposites in imagination, a power of the mind which is evident in poems as well as in science and therefore distinguishes the poem from science by discriminating different ends, Brooks distinguishes between science and poetry by attributing to poetry a structure derived, not according to the differentiation of ends, but from what had been

Coleridge's formula for 'poetry' considered as the creative activity of the mind. The primary consequence of this shift is "the disappearance of the distinction between 'manner' and 'matter', or the 'form' and 'substance', of poems" (Critics, 90). In Coleridge's system the organic relation of the parts to the whole in a poem is subordinated by the differentiating end in contrast with science. That is, the end of science is truth and the end of a poem is pleasure (the particular pleasure of a "composite so organized as to produce as much immediate pleasure by its parts as is compatible with a maximum of pleasure from the whole").[9] But with the elimination of the distinction of discriminating ends in Brooks' system, the distinction between form and matter is also eliminated. The organic structure of a poem, the principle of the relation of the parts to the whole, is no longer derived from the principle of its formal end, but from the principle implied in that quality which distinguishes all poetry from all science.

This quality, the synthesizing of discordant elements, is found in the poet's language "as an instrument determined to poetry rather than to science" (Critics, 92). Thus the organizing structure of a poem runs not from the poet to the poem, in the sense of the poet's particular intention, but from "'the language of poetry' to the ironical or para-doxical 'structure of poetry', which the poet's choice of this kind of language, instead of that of science, makes inevitable" (Critics, 92). Nor is it "... any special principle of unity derived from the nature of the 'experience' or object represented in a given poem that determines poetical structure; rather it is the presence in poems of poetical struc-ture -- i.e., ironical opposition and resolution -- that determines, and

is a sign of, the unification of experience" (<u>Critics</u>, 95).

The limitation of Brooks' system becomes apparent when one considers that Brooks is not content to point out the value of the concept of irony (the most general term we have for the kind of structural synthesizing of discordant elements he suggests) and to offer his analysis of texts as illustrations of one point, among others, in poetic theory, but insists that "there is no other principle save that denoted by the words 'irony' or 'paradox' from which significant propositions concerning poems can be derived" (<u>Critics</u>, 84). Given Brooks' monistic reduction of critical terms and "his choice of language rather than subject matter or the poet or the ends of poetry as the unique basis of all his explanations", Crane concludes that Brooks is "a complete monist," even "a material monist":

His [Brooks] whole effort can be described not unfairly as an attempt to erect a theory of poetry by extending and analogizing from the simple proposition of grammar that the meaning of one word or group of words is modified by its juxtaposition in discourse with another word or group of words. (<u>Critics</u>, 93)

Crane has two significant doubts as to the adequacy of Brooks' principle of organic structure. The principle of organic structure, that the poet's language of paradox inevitably organizes itself, when two or more words are put together, "into organic relationships according to some pattern of ambiguity, metaphor or ironic contrast" (<u>Critics</u>, 95), (a pattern which is derived from the words in context, since it can come from nowhere else) excludes the whole range of questions turning on the specific differences in poetic ends and the artistic rationale for realization of these ends. Brooks' readings, the method of which may be described as the

repeated application of his central paradigm of poetry to particular poems for the sake of uncovering, in the significances which can be attributed to their statements when taken in context, hitherto unnoticed occurences of ironical 'complexity', first on the level of single words and lines, and then on the level of the interrelationships between larger passages, until the end of the poem is reached.... (<u>Critics</u>, 98)

provide no critical tools for discussing the particular dramatic effect,

or the particular ethical quality of a poem because these concepts have

been excluded as part of the 'form-matter' dichotomy inimical to the

concept of the organic structure of poetry.

Crane argues that "literally speaking ... a poet does not write

poetry but individual poems. And these are inevitably, as finished wholes,

instances of one or another poetic kind, differentiated not by the neces-

sities of the linguistic instrument of poetry [since the instrument is

constant] but primarily by the nature of the poet's conception, as finally

embodied in his poem of a particular form to be achieved..." (<u>Critics</u>, 96).

It is this conception of the poem as an artistic whole which determines

the particulars of the poem; the words, metaphors or 'paradoxes' are

appropriate to the concept of the whole, not vice versa. For Brooks

'form' or 'structure' is inherent in the nature of the sum of the constit-

uent elements, but for Crane 'form' or structure is a principle over and

above these constituent elements. In Brooks' critical system "the words

of poetry have ... become all-important, to the neglect or obscuration

of all the factors in poetic production which determine, for the poet,

what the words ought to be..." (<u>Critics</u>, 106).

Crane argues the inadequacy of Brooks' critical theory on two

counts: first, in terms of what his monistic concern with the language

of poetry forces him to leave out of his discussion of structure, and

second, on the basis that the assumption that irony is a quality peculiar to poetry is a false assumption. Although it follows from Brooks' dialectic division of all discourse into two kinds not merely that 'irony' and 'paradox' are universally present in poems, "but that the 'structure' these terms signify is the differentia of poems, the sufficient cause which distinguishes them essentially from all other kinds of works in which language is employed" (Critics, 101), the proof of this proposition is not simply readings of poems which demonstrate that irony is existent as a structural principle, but readings of complete works other than poems which demonstrate that "when they are analyzed in the same way, the same phenomena of contextual qualification and 'irony' do not appear" (Critics, 102). Furthermore, ironic 'structure' is common to all discourse, indeed common to words themselves in that a word presents more than one idea. He concludes, therefore, that its significance must be qualified by the particular context, and offers, solely on Brooks' criteria for poetic structure, Einstein's formula $E=MC^2$ as the "greatest 'ironical' poem written so far in the twentieth century" (Critics, 105).

The reductio ad absurdum of Brooks' analysis illustrates the principal error in it, namely, the assumption of "one only of the several internal causes of poems, and the cause which they have most completely in common with other literary productions, namely, their linguistic matter" (Critics, 105), as the inherent structural cause of all poetry. The general critical principle of the organic structure of a poem is inadequate because it prevents Brooks from dealing adequately with poetic works in terms of the sufficient or distinguishing causes of artistic production, and the particular principle of inherent poetic structure

expounded by Brooks, the paradox of language, inadequately distinguishes literary works from other kinds. Furthermore, Crane suggests that this fundamental error is inherent in Brooks' very approach to literature. Consequently, the solution to the inadequacy of Brooks' criticism is a reconstruction of the principles applied to literature:

... to substitute the matter-of-fact and concrete for the abstract; the a posteriori for the a priori; the argument from immediately sensible and particular poetic effects to their proximate causes for the argument from remote and non-poetic causes to only general and common poetic effects. It would be, in a word, to study poems as complete wholes possessed of distinctive powers rather than merely the materials and devices of poetry in a context of extra-poetic considerations. (Critics, 107)

The self-contained and limited character of Crane's essays on Richards and on Brooks is apparent. As a refutation of individual critical approaches the essays have an important but limited value, but as representative of an approach to the evaluation of critical theory, the essays gain wider significance. The inclusion of these two essays in Critics and Criticism does indicate the claim to their wider significance, but the implicit assumptions behind these two essays, which contribute to this wider significance, are not easy to detect. For this reason Crane includes an introduction to Critics and Criticism; for the same reason it is useful to look to this introduction for clarification of those critical principles which lie behind the essays on Richards and Brooks.

Given the very confusion, the diversities and oppositions existent among literary critics, Crane's essays are surely redundant unless he offers first some principle which distinguishes his attempts to rectify the errors of other critics from the already too numerous divisions. This principle is simply the recognition that literary criticism, as a reasoned discourse is "... an organization of terms, propositions, and arguments

the particular character of which, in any instance, depends <u>as much upon</u> <u>factors operative in the construction of the discourse itself</u> as upon the nature of the [artistic] objects it envisions..." (<u>Critics</u>, pp. 6-7, italics mine). The factors operant in critical discourse are more than simply a finite number of critical terms and implied definitions which provide a conceptual scheme for interpreting the art object as a certain kind of thing. They also include the assumed method of application of critical principles and verification of critical insights. Critical terminology is unlimited in that it may be derived historically and adapted to any particular framework, but methods of procedure are limited to two, 'abstract' and 'matter of fact', and may be briefly contrasted:

[the critic moves] from assumed general principles to their applications by dialectical division and resolution or from observed effects to their necessary and sufficient antecedents by hypothetical causal inference; whether he argues concerning the relation of parts to wholes in terms of the literally discriminable functions of the parts or in terms of their reflection of, or participation in, the characteristics he ascribes to the whole; whether he holds his terms constant and varies his treatment of things accordingly or holds things constant and allows the meanings of his terms to vary from context to context; or whether he resolves his problems integrally "by referring poetry, for example, to some analogue of poetry" and "finding characteristics of poetry which are shared by the analogue", or differentially "by separating poetry from its analogues", and "finding characteristics which are peculiar to poetry". (Olsen, <u>Critics</u>, 549, cited in <u>Critics</u>, 8)

Crane argues therefore, that "... there can be no genuine refutation of a critical position except within the particular framework of concepts and rules of inference in which it has been asserted" (<u>Critics</u>, 8). The first series of questions about any particular critical framework of 'language' are 'internal', that is, "questions of fact or theory to which true or false answers can be given within the conceptual and logical bounds of the framework".[10] The second series of questions are 'external', that

is, questions having to do with the justification of the language itself.
But given the relativity of critical languages, the question of the external
justification of critical language is of a particular kind; that is, one
may argue only from the particular concept of the artistic fact and the
particular critical procedures necessarily dictated by this prior concep-
tion to the value of the certain set of questions that the language is
equipped to deal with, which one could not ask, much less answer intelli-
gibly, in another critical language. Thus Crane admits not only a rela-
tivity of "questions and statements to frameworks" but also "of frameworks
to ends, that is, to the different kinds of knowledge about poetry we may
happen, at one time or another or for one or another reason, to want"
(Languages, 27).

Since the limitations, no less than the particular powers of any
critical discourse may be deduced from its operant principles, and since
there is no way of defending on ultimate philosophical grounds the final
end of criticism, the value of any particular critical language may not
be dogmatically asserted over any other critical language. Nor may the
partial truth of a critical language be incorporated into some more
eclectic approach, because such synthesizing implies a prior separation
from the critical framework which gives any useful concept its definitive
meaning. Crane's solution is a recognition of the plurality of critical
languages, and given this plurality, a recognition of the instrumental
value of a critical language.

The pluralistic critic ... would take the view that the basic principles
and methods of any distinguishable mode of criticism are tools of inquiry
and interpretation rather than formulations of the 'real' nature of things
and that the choice of any special 'language', among the many possible

for the study of poetry, is a practical decision to be justified solely in terms of the kind of knowledge the critic wants to attain. (Languages, 31)

He would ... look upon critical principles ... as instruments of research and appreciation, any set of which is necessarily limited in relation both to the aspects of poetry it brings into view and to the kind of conclusions it permits the critic to reach. (Languages, 32)

Crane acknowledges that "it follows from this pluralistic and instrumentalist view of criticism" that the critic's choice between different critical languages is a "practical decision and hence immune to theoretical questioning", and of the same nature as "the decision (say) to study medicine, rather than law" (Critics, 9). Although the analogy may not be a particularly good one, the point remains. Quite simply, the art object is many things; therefore the critic is obligated to recognize that any particular critical theory cannot comprehend this diversity and that he must select his critical tools according to the kind of knowledge he wishes to obtain. Furthermore this selection is made on the basis of certain pre-critical principles.

These pre-critical principles may be defined as a kind of "sensibility and knowledge", or "a kind of tact in the use or application of principles (whatever their kind)" (Critics, 9). They arise from the simple recognition that no matter how well the critic may be trained in critical theory, without particular knowledge and sensitivity or taste in response to a literary work, there can be no good practical criticism. There are examples, Arnold may be cited as one, of critics who are able to work with a minimum of critical theory; the particular power of such practical criticism is simply equated with the moral insight and literary tact of the critic himself. We know through a 'common sense' acquaintance with literature that it has an integral, though complex, relation to life;

on the other hand we value literature for reasons which distinguish art from other things. We know too that poetry is not simply one thing. We value different poems for the pleasure peculiar to the individual poem, and we recognize that these differences depend, in no simple way, upon unique combinations of language, subject matter, technique and structure. Good practical criticism includes a recognition of these complexities, and this is generally what we denote when we speak of 'critical sensitivity' or 'taste' (cf Languages preface, ix-x).

We can apply this kind of pre-critical criteria not only to the individual critic, but to the critical framework. We do recognize that the inadequacy of some kinds of practical criticism cannot be attributed either to a lack of particular knowledge or insensitive application of critical theory. Neither Richards nor Brooks are accused of these faults. At this point it is legitimate to question the adequacy of the critical theory itself. Our concept of 'adequacy' is itself pre-critical, that is, based upon a "common sense apprehension ... of the multiple likenesses and differences exhibited by literary works and of the variety of causes necessary to their production" (Critics, 10), but in the light of this pre-critical awareness "we can discriminate between critical systems ... which permit a reasonably many-sided or comprehensive discussion of literary phenomena -- i.e., which abound in pertinent and usable distinctions -- and other systems, ... which content themselves with partial views while pretending to omit nothing essential" (Critics, 10). Consequently the focus of Crane's criticism is "the analytical precision and the range of competent concepts" afforded within the framework of any critical method (Languages, 36). This focus does not imply that other

values, namely, particular knowledge and sensitive response, are not important for the practising critic, but that these values may be held constant in any discussion of the adequacy of a particular critical framework (Languages, preface, xi).

The type of critical languages which Crane calls deficient in terms of our pre-critical awareness of the multiplicity of art are those which tend to explain all poetry in terms of only one, at the most only a few, of the many causes of poems, or those which concentrate on the similarities among poems to the neglect of all but accidental differences and others which reduce all critical distinctions to one common denominator (Critics, 10; also see Languages, 35). Crane's essays on Richards and on Brooks call attention to these deficiencies, deficiencies which Crane sees as methodological limitations. Given the "mutual interdependence of the subject-matter a critic actually talks about and the method of inquiry and argument by which it is constituted for him in his discussion" (Languages, 25), and given that Richards and Brooks have adopted an 'abstract' rather than 'matter of fact' approach to poetry (the distinction between these two basic methodological approaches is made above), Crane raises the question whether what is called 'matter of fact' criticisms "are not less likely, in general, to do violence to our common sense apprehension of literature or poetry than the 'abstract' criticism" [of say, Richards and Brooks] (Languages, 37).

The negative aspect of Crane's critical theory is his refutation of those types of critics identified by their methodological approach to poetry as 'abstract'. The positive aspect of Crane's critical theory,

to which we now turn, is the development of the alternative methodological approach, a 'matter-of-fact' approach to poetry, the starting point of which is the critical method of Aristotle. Concerning this aspect of Crane's critical theory, only two sections of Critics and Criticism are useful, part III of the introduction and the essay "The Concept of Plot and the Plot of Tom Jones", which is better understood in another context. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to two chapters of The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry, chapter II ("Poetic structure in the language of Aristotle") and chapter V ("Toward a more adequate criticism of poetic structure") in which Crane fully develops his 'neo-aristotelian' stance.

Without minimizing Crane's strong 'temperamental affinity' for and admiration of the poetic method of Aristotle, it is necessary to qualify the identification between Crane's critical theory and Aristotle's poetic. Crane's explication of Aristotle's Poetics (chapter II, "Poetic structure in the language of Aristotle") is an accurate rendering of the text in that "it takes account of the most important passages in his other works which might be expected to throw light on the meanings of the general terms ... and on the nature and implications of the method he is evidently employing" (Languages, 78), and in that it respects the language itself, "as a set of basic concepts derived and defined in accordance with a distinctive method" (Languages, 81). However, Crane defines the nature of his adherence to this text as no more than "... a strictly pragmatic and nonexclusive commitment ... to hypotheses about poetry and poetics that seem ... capable of being developed into a comprehensive critical method, ... peculiarly adapted to the study of problems ... still significant but for the solution of which none of the prevailing modes of

criticism affords the necessary analytic tools" (<u>Critics</u>, 12-13, italics mine). Before discussing the particular critical problems which Crane thinks Aristotle's poetic may be adapted to, it is necessary to mention specific points of departure.

Crane denotes three specific points of departure, the concept of imitation, the concept of pleasure as the final end of poetry, and the concept of genre. For Crane the concept of imitation, in its most general meaning, does not imply more than "an empirically verifiable hypothesis for distinguishing objects of art from natural things", nor in its more restricted sense (imitation as one possible final cause in poetry) does it imply "that all poems are imitations, though unquestionably many of them are" (<u>Critics</u>, 18). Nor is Crane committed to the principle which defines the end of poetry as simply pleasure. All that Crane means to point out by this term 'pleasure' is the principle, noted by other critics as well, "that when poems ... are well made, pleasure is bound to result, the peculiar quality of which in any mimetic poem, is a sign of its form" (<u>Critics</u>, 18). Thirdly, Crane does not see that his Aristotelian commitment must imply "that the critic must think of distinctions among poetic species ... as signifying ideal values in the light of which individual productions may be compared and judged by considering the degree of their approximation to a previously determined norm" (<u>Critics</u>, 18). Crane sees these generic distinctions only as "heuristic devices for discovering what are the relevant questions to be asked about individual works he [the critic] proposes to study" (<u>Critics</u>, 18). Each concept implies a critical fallacy, respectively, the 'mimetic' fallacy, the affective fallacy and the genetic fallacy, of which Crane has been accused, but

such accusations ignore Crane's recognition of these faults inherent in

Aristotle's terms and his repudiation or qualification of them.

W.K. Wimsatt's major criticism of the Chicago school, "The Chicago

Critics: The Fallacy of the Neoclassic Species,"[11] attacks Crane on each

of these three points. Wimsatt argues first that although

the Chicago critics never come to the point of making the full mimesis
of Aristotelian tragic theory a requirement for all poems, there is a
strong suggestion that such mimesis is the center of their poetic. And
the Aristotelian synolon, or whole object, which is the avowed center of
their poetics, is indeed best conceived as an external object when the
poetic words refer to an action which can be so fully externalized as
Greek drama. (Wimsatt, 58-59)

Although Wimsatt is correct in noting the centrality of the mimetic concept,

and the relation of the concept of mimesis to the concept of the whole

object, he fails to recognize that in laying down the concept of 'imitation'

as a basic presupposition about the nature of art neither Aristotle, nor

Crane after him, is committed to any

particular doctrine concerning the basis of our knowledge of things (whether
'epistemological realism' or anything else) or concerning the peculiar
value concrete things as opposed to abstractions or any dogma of art such
as would lead us to prefer 'idealized' to 'realistic' representations or
the reverse. (Languages, 48)

Crane argues that in making the distinction between mimetic and non-mimetic

poems, Aristotle is simply saying that

the various kinds of 'poetic' works he intends to inquire into are wholes
of the particular variety in which the patterns that organize the artistic
matter and thus account most completely ... for the distinctive powers of
his creations, are patterns recognizably similar to one or another of the
morally determinate patterns of human behavior we are aware of in life.
(Languages, 48)

The only useful distinction which Crane derives from the concept of

'imitation' is the distinction between mimetic and didactic poems, a

distinction based upon the formal principle of each. In a mimetic poem

"the formal nature is constituted of some particular human activity or

state of feeling qualified morally and emotionally in a certain way, the
beautiful rendering of this in words being the sufficient end of the poet's
effort"; and in a didactic poem "the formal nature is constituted of some
particular thesis, intellectual or practical, relative to some general
human interest, the artful elaboration and enforcement of this by what-
ever means are available and appropriate being the sufficient end of the
poet's effort" (Languages, 158).

Secondly, Wimsatt sees a "latent affectivism" in the Aristotelian
claim that the end of poetry is pleasure not truth (Wimsatt, 60), but
Wimsatt ignores the particular kind of pleasure Crane speaks about in the
context his definition of the end of poetry. It is the aesthetic pleasure
of "the composite so organized as to produce as much immediate pleasure
by its parts as is compatible with a maximum of pleasure from the whole"
(Critics, 88), which Crane defines as the end of poetry. This kind of
'pleasure' is qualitatively different than the kind of pleasure, catering
to audience interests, which implies an affective fault.

Thirdly, Wimsatt notes a genetic fallacy in the Chicago critics'
appeal outside the poem to the intention of the poet. "Their point of
reference for the unity, the design, the end of a poetic composition is
so heavily schematized that it is almost bound to lie outside the compo-
sition itself -- in the name or theory, for instance, of some poetic
'species'" (Wimsatt, 61). Furthermore, "the wholes contemplated by Crane
and his friends are not only ideally but actually, those indicated
by the main and superfically inseparable shapes of works ... by
genre definitions .... Other critics, those attacked by Crane, have
shown more marked tendency to look upon the larger architectural wholes

as ideals to be recognized when encountered but also to be tested severely in their parts" (Wimsatt, 51). This criticism Crane distinctly repudiates. Crane sees the question of the architectural principles of poetry as a question of empirical fact, not deductive theory; therefore, although we may be assisted in determining the structural principle of a poem by general distinctions, such as genre distinctions, what we look for first is a fact --

possibly a fact of a kind that has no complete parallel in the earlier or later history of poetry, inasmuch as it is a mark of good poets that they try to avoid repeating too often the inventions of others. It is fatal therefore to think that we can know the shaping principle of any poem in advance, or what amounts to the same thing in practice, that we can get at it in terms of any predetermined conception or model of what structure in poetry ... in general either is or ought to be. (Languages, 146)

Crane is thinking in particular of coming to a poem equipped with "paradigms of poetry, or of epic, tragedy, lyric, and so on" (Languages, 146).

The central concept which Crane derives from Aristotle's poetic is the conception of poetic works as synola or concrete artistic wholes (Critics, 17). Thus the starting point of Crane's neo-aristotelian criticism is:

the peculiar natures of the artistic wholes their writers were engaged in constructing and which attempts to explain and appreciate their parts, and the relations these bear to one another, as poetically necessary or desirable consequences of the writers' commitment to certain kinds of poetic structures and effects rather than others. (Critics, 15)

The two particular questions about poetic structure which arise out of this conception of the 'poetic' object are first, what is the "specific constitution and power of the whole" (Critics, 15), and having determined this, the second question is "to what extent, and with what degree of artistic compulsion, any of the particular things the writer has done at the various levels of his writing, down to the details of his imagery and language, can be seen to follow from the special requirements or

opportunities which the kind of whole he is making presents to him"
(Critics, 16). These questions are about the structure of poems, "the
internal causes which account for the peculiar construction and effect
of any poem qua artistic whole" (Critics, 20), and not about qualities
or the "whole complex of accidental causes of variation in poetry"
[biographical data, social, political or economic influences, educational
or artistic environment] (Critics, 20). For this particular purpose
Aristotle's system is comprehensive because it provides "though only
in an outline sketch, hypotheses and analytical devices for defining
literally and inductively, and with a maximum degree of differentiation,
the multiple causes operative in the construction of poetic wholes"
(Critics, 17); that is, the terms of Aristotle's analysis are suited not
merely to the description of the "material content or technical configu-
ration" of the parts of the whole, but "to the functions they can be made
to serve" (Critics, 20).

The first principle of Aristotle's concept of the artistic whole
is that given the two natures of the artistic whole, the formal nature
and the material nature, which our analysis of any poem must take account,
"'the formal nature is of greater importance than the material nature',
inasmuch as the 'form' of any individual object ... is the principle or
cause 'by reason of which the matter is some definite thing'."[12] This
is the principle of Crane's criticism of Richards and Brooks. The modern
critics of whom Richards and Brooks are prime examples have tended "to
argue to what the structure of poetry is from an initial consideration
of its material elements of language.... The [structural] necessity,
in short, is a necessity not of any particular end or effect a poet may

be trying to achieve but of the nature of the matter he is using..."
(Languages, 105). On the other hand, although Crane would not say that
we cease to talk about the matter of a poem (in the sense of the material
nature of its language or of its 'content') whenever we examine the formal
structure of a poem, any concept of structure necessarily implies a sub-
ordination, according to some organizing principle, of some parts to
other parts. In this relative sense, Crane argues that we may speak "of
the words of a poem as the material basis of the thought they express,
although words also have a form as being conceived in sentences and
rhythms ... [or] we may speak of thought as the matter of character, of
character and thought in words as the matter of action or emotion, and
so on up to but not including the overall form which synthesizes all
these subordinate elements"(Languages, 154, italics mine). The simple
practical critical principle implied is that any analysis of the parts
of a poem remains incomplete until we determine the principle which
shapes the materials of diction, character or action for the sake of a
particular effect. This shaping principle is not inherent in the material
nature of the poem (either the language or the 'content'), rather it is
a 'formal' principle, an organizing principle imposed upon the artistic
material. This conception of the structural nature of poems, the struc-
tural relation of the parts of a poem to the intended effect, or end, is
the most important contribution to our critical understanding of poetic
structure which Crane derives from Aristotle.

The second major contribution is "the method of investigating
and reasoning which he [Aristotle] found appropriate to the structures
of this kind" (Languages, 154). Given Aristotle's concern with the

elements and subordinate parts of the poem and their structural relation to the poetic work, viewed as a concrete whole, the questions which Aristotle pursues are questions of poetic reasoning rather than (say) questions of poetic process -- "from the character of the end to be achieved to the necessary or desirable means" (Languages, 46). The questions of poetic process are two: first, "what different forms can go with what different matters, and, second, what parts and what constructions of each of them are necessary to the achievement of any given form" (Languages, 154). In Aristotle's system these questions are 'matter of fact' rather than 'abstract' questions; that is, Aristotle begins, not with some general concept of 'what different forms can go with different matters' but with actual concrete examples of 'what forms' poets have in fact put with 'different matters'. The process of reasoning is inductive (in Aristotle's sense of induction) "from particulars to the universals they embody and from ends or forms thus defined, by hypothetical necessity to the essential conditions of their realization in poetic matter" (Languages, 155).

Crane argues that Aristotle's poetic method "can be described in universal terms in such a manner as to remove it effectually from the circumstances of its historical origin and make it accessible, once its nature is clarified and its potentialities further developed, as a method for common use today" (Critics, 17). Generally, Aristotle's method is a posteriori rather than a priori, literal rather than abstract, functional rather than differential. Its particular virtue is that "... it is suited to the literal investigation and explanation of poetic works in their uniqueness and particularity; in terms of their immediate and

hence distinctively 'poetic', rather than their remoter, causes and effects; with a complexity of analysis commensurate with the complexity of the poetic process and of poetic appreciation itself" (Critics, 22-23). As such it is a necessary corrective to the qualitative and general criticism of the 'new critics', which has attempted to differentiate poetry from other kinds of discourse, but has failed to develop concepts of the structures of poetry which go further than the dialectical distinction upon which they are based, and which, in this pursuit of qualities of all poetry has ignored the particularity of the individual works.

Crane's ultimate defense of Aristotle's principles is his assertion of their 'adequacy' or 'comprehensiveness' in relation to our pre-critical awareness of the multiplicity of art. Crane argues that the concepts derived from Aristotle's basic concept of the poetic 'concrete' whole are comprehensive because they "embrace all the elements necessary, in some particular determination and ordering, to the existence of a poem of any kind as a made object productive of definite effects upon our minds" and furthermore, these terms "can be further extended or specified in various ways to fit the peculiarities of different or newly developed species of poems without abandonment of their original analytic bases" (Critics, 20). Secondly, the method is comprehensive because of "the devices it affords for discriminating a posteriori an indefinite number of different poetic forms or principles of construction and for dealing differentially with the common elements these involve, in terms ... of the functions they can be made to serve" (Critics, 20). But this claim must meet the proof of practical application. It is necessary therefore to turn to selective examples of Crane's practical criticism in order to

ascertain the full potentialities or the inherent limitations of his

critical theory.

The first concrete examples of practical criticism of the neo-

aristotelian method are two analyses of the lyric poem, Norman F. Maclean's

analysis of Wordsworth's sonnet "It is a beauteous evening, calm and free",

simply entitled "An Analysis of a Lyric poem", and Elder Olson's analysis

of Yeat's "Sailing to Byzantium", much more ambitiously entitled "Sailing

to Byzantium: Prolegomena to a Poetics of the Lyric". The two essays

appeared together in the Spring, 1942 edition of Kansas City University

Review and were preceded by a "prefatory note" by Crane, which explained

the theoretical principles implicit in the two criticisms.[13] Crane's

prefatory note is first an attack on the general and analogical mode of

criticism practiced by the 'new critics', a mode of criticism whose

principles and definitions do not respect the peculiar quality of the

individual poem. The essays by Maclean and Olson offer a viable alter-

native, as criticisms whose principles are determined "... peculiarly to

the work viewed as a product of a specific kind of art ... [and which]

... aid directly in making clear how the parts of the poem in all its

detail are necessitated by the whole that is being achieved" (University

Review, 201). The nature of the criticism conducted by Maclean and Olson

is an "inductive study of lyrics pursued apart from any a priori assump-

tions about the nature of poetry in general" (University Review, 201).

The essay by Maclean simply proposes to determine the parts of

the poem and account for their relationship. The search for the parts

of the poem may begin on the simple material level, but the identification

of these parts is only half the task of an organic criticism. Some account

of the relation of these parts must be given. Maclean's central thesis
is that although "the beginning of a lyric, like that of a dramatic or
narrative poem, is an effect for which the poem as such has to offer no
causal explanation ... [the explanation being the reader's 'willing
suspension of disbelief'] ... it becomes the cause of all that follows,
..." (University Review, 206); therefore, to give an account of a lyric
in terms of its beginning, identifies the particular effect intended in
the poem (the principle which distinguishes it from all other poems of
the same theme), and explains the structural relation of the parts to
the particular whole. By the way, Maclean illustrates the effectiveness
of his method of analysis by comparing this interpretation of the poem
with Lequouis' rather esoteric biographical interpretation of the poem.[14]

The purpose of the essay by Olson is to propose, through the
analysis of a particular poem, some framing principles for a poetics of
the lyric. Olson's procedure is 'Aristotelian' only in the sense that
it reduces the attempt to discover a poetics to an attempt to discover
the principle of unity and order in a poem. This principle must be purely
poetic, that is, a principle of the poem and not something extrinsic to
it; furthermore, it is a formal principle Olson seeks, that is, a principle
of such a nature "that everything else in the poem would be found to be
explicable in terms of it" (University Review, 211). Contrary to the
practice of the 'new critics', Olson does not find this principle in the
language of the poem itself:

On the merely verbal level, again, we can account for nothing; the words
must be explained in terms of something else, not the poem in terms of
the words; and further, a principle must be a principle of something
other than itself; hence the words cannot be a principle of their own
arrangements. (University Review, 217)

Olson argues further that "while the choice of metaphors and modes of embodiment was initially arbitrary, once the metaphors have been stated they must be carried out according to the dictates of the problem" (University Review, 218). Olson's analysis of the metaphor and diction of the poem is in terms of the stages of the dialectic argument which he has identified as the formal principles of the poem; furthermore, it is possible to treat the 'events' of a poem as the dialectically separable stages of the poetic argument, or the 'dramatic voice' of the poem as the 'character' determined by the nature of the argument (University Review, 218). The basis of Olson's analysis is the conception of words as no more than the medium which is shaped toward a pre-conceived end. Olson therefore concludes that since the words of a poem are determined by every other element in the poem, there is a legitimate sense in which words are the least important part of the poem.

Two articles which appeared simultaneously in Sewanee Review, 1944 offer a positive and negative evaluation of the practical criticism of Maclean and Olson. Hoyt Trowbridge concludes his outline of the 'neo-aristotelian' school and the 'new criticism' by affirming the place of the criticism which Maclean and Olson demonstrate.[15] John Crowe Ransom takes the other side in his essay "The Basis of Criticism".[16] Ransom's complaint is that both papers are no more than elaborate explications du texte. They have a distinctly 'academic' flavour in the sense that "a good academician will not only labor but labor the obvious, and will not only labor the obvious but do it with flourishes, as if to show that his heart is in it" ("Basis of Criticism", 557). It is difficult to regard Ransom's complaint as more than prejudice. The illustrative nature of

the articles by Maclean and Olson necessitates the simple explication, according to principle, of a simply understood poem. The alternative for the simple explication of the text may be a more 'imaginative' explication of the kind which Maclean refutes in his discussion of Legouis' biographical speculations as to the identity (and the implied significance of the identity) of the child addressed in Wordsworth's sonnet (University Review, 204 ff). We may even grant that Maclean and Olson are somewhat insensitive in their analysis of the poems and still argue that the method of approach they use is valid; that is, the method in itself, even demonstrated at its lowest mean, is a valid critical approach.

The differences between Maclean and Olson and Ransom is more than simply a more sophisticated version of the old "town and gown" controversy ("Basis of Criticism", 570). Ransom's rhetorical complaint against the "barren formalism" ("Basis of Criticism", 557) of Olson's analysis of Yeats' poem legitimately points to a failure in Olson's kind of approach: a pre-occupation with the structural and formal elements of the poem, to the neglect of those qualities which infuse life into the poem. (These qualities which Olson neglects are described as 'commonplaces', moral, semantic, syntactic and pragmatic commonplaces, and are, as far as Ransom is concerned, the bases of criticism.) ("Basis of Criticism", 564-570). Secondly, Ransom's impatience with the burdened simplicity of both interpretations, poetic analysis reduced to 'paraphrase', identifies the particular effect of a certain cause, the minimizing of language. The reduction of words to the least important element in the poetic analysis leads to sterility and simplicity, for particularly in a lyric poem, the complexity of effect, is conveyed in the poetic language. Ransom's

criticisms apply more to Olson than to Maclean, to the degree that Maclean pays closer attention to the individual words of the poem; furthermore Maclean's close attention to the words augments, but does not contradict his principles of formal analysis. However, there remains an important question, whether these shortcomings are faults peculiar to Maclean and Olson, or whether they indicate weaknesses inherent in the critical system itself. It is therefore necessary to consider, with this question in mind, Crane's most important example of practical criticism,[17] "The Concept of Plot and the Plot of Tom Jones."

Crane clearly defines the limiting characteristic of his essay on Tom Jones: "My intention ... has been not so much to attempt a revaluation of Tom Jones as to make clear the assumptions and illustrate some of the possibilities for practical criticism of a ... whole-part analysis of narrative compositions" (Critics, 645, italics mine). It may be noted, as an example of the academic temper of Crane's approach to criticism, that even his very limited practical criticism exists primarily for the purposes of illustrative analysis, and secondarily for its own sake, as artistic appreciation and evaluation. This would be a serious criticism if one supposed that one could not fault Crane's analysis on any particular and illustrative point, the principle being more important than any particular example; if one particular example doesn't work, presumably another one could be found. However, given the peculiar empirical and inductive character of Crane's critical system,[18] it is legitimate to fault the hypotheses if they cannot be adequately supported by practical examples.

The principle of Crane's analysis is the Aristotelian concept of the work of art as an artistic whole which effects a particular response

through "... the functioning together of its elements in subordination to a determinate poetic form" (Critics, 645). Crane equates this determinate poetic form in the novel with the concept of plot: "... the form of the plot -- in the sense of that which makes its matter into a definite artistic thing -- is ... its distinctive 'working or power' ... the final end which everything in the work, if that is to be felt as a whole, must be made, directly or indirectly, to serve" (Critics, 622). Our analysis of plot necessarily takes account of the constituent elements of any poem, namely, "... the things that are imitated (or "rendered") in it, the linguistic medium in which they are imitated and the manner or technique of imitation" (Critics, 620); and beyond this, the material elements of any novel or drama constructed on mimetic principles, action, character and thought, but these are "necessary, but not sufficient conditions of a good plot, the positive excellence of which depends upon the power of its peculiar synthesis of character, action, and thought, as inferable from the sequence of words, to move our feelings powerfully and pleasurably in a certain definite way" (Critics, 622). Consequently, the kind of criticism which Crane proposes takes as its starting point this concept of the formal power of plot, and in the light of this first principle proceeds to inquire into the relation of the parts.

This kind of criticism begins by looking into the matter of the work in an attempt to come to some kind of understanding of what the unifying idea which holds the work together actually is. Such under-standing is, of course, hypothetical but it is the peculiar character-istic of this hypothesis that not only must it be clearly implied by the observable traits of the work, it must adequately explain the relations

of the observable traits of the whole. Crane does not find any formula

which would potentially include the artistic principle of the unity of

Tom Jones in either of the four distinct lines of action which can be

identified, for although the novel would certainly not be the same if

any one of these were left out, "no one of them so subsumes all the rest

as to justify us considering it, even on the level of the material action,

as the principle of the whole" (Critics, 624). Such a formula depends

upon a detailed examination of the "intricate scheme of probabilities,

involving moral choices, mistaken judgments, and accidents of Fortune"

(Critics, 624), which binds these four main lines of action together.

Through this kind of analysis Crane attempts to discover more than the

plot in the sense of the "necessary substrate of unified and probable

action" (Critics, 631); he seeks some understanding of the plot as "the

formal principle which makes of this system a definitely effective whole

and which actually operates ... to direct our emotionalized expectations

..." (Critics, 631). The setting up of a workable hypothesis as to the

formal principle which governs the whole is only the first step in Crane's

analysis;[19] the primary critical question is "the extent to which Fielding's

handling of the constituent parts of the novel is calculated to sustain

and maximize this special pleasure which is its form" (Critics, 638).

It is clear from the way Crane has formed what he sees to be the

central critical question about Tom Jones, that this method is better

adapted to appreciation of a literary work than to comparative evaluation.

Crane's judgment of Tom Jones is only "in relation to the nature and

requirements of the particular task [Fielding] has set himself, the

assumed end being the perfection of the work as an artistic whole of the

special kind he decided it should be" (Critics, 646). But this kind of

judgement implies criteria of its own kind by which one can move from

appreciation of a particular poem to an evaluative statement. We are

able to distinguish poems that as a whole are well constructed, but con-

tain nothing in particular which may invite a second reading, and poems

which are rich in particular virtues only. The latter may be judged better

than the former, but both are clearly inferior to that kind which aims at

and achieves Coleridge's criterion of "the production of as much immediate

pleasure in the parts as is compatible with the sum of the pleasure in

the whole".[20] For example, although we laud the comic vitality of Fielding's

minor characters, we must ask "whether given the comic form of the novel

as a whole, any more lifelike 'doing' would have not entailed a departure

from the mean which this imposed" (Critics, 640). Furthermore, we plainly

recognize that even a mediocre writer can meet at least the minimum

requirements of the poetic task he has set for himself. The kind of appre-

ciation which leads to an evaluation must therefore judge the poem not only

in terms of the necessities of the form, but in terms of its possibilities,

the "maximum realization of the form" (Critics, 639). In Tom Jones the

particular comic effect at which Fielding aims and which determines the

formal principle of the work, is "enhanced in proportion as, in each incident,

the discovery is made unexpectedly and by precisely those persons whose

knowledge of what Tom has done will be most damaging to him, and by as

many of these as possible so that the consequences for him are not simple

but compounded" (Critics, 639). Still, the kind of judgements which Crane

makes about a work is better called appreciation than evaluation, because

he offers no general criteria which may be used as a basis for comparative

judgements. This fact is acknowledged: Crane admits that the method he
proposes is "better adapted ... to the appreciation of success or failure
in individual works than it is to the making of comparative judgements
based on criteria of literary 'greatness' or 'seriousness' that transcend
differences of kind ..." (Critics, 646).

Winters offers an important criticism of Crane's system at this
point:

[Although Crane] ... insists on the importance of studying the various
literary forms, their subdivisions and aspects, in order that we may
understand the principles governing them ... there seems to be no con-
sistent awareness in his remarks that the most important end of such
study would be the establishment of some kind of hierarchy of poten-
tialities among the various forms, their subdivisions and their elements;
nor that the establishment of any such hierarchy would be impossible
unless we had a clear idea of what the final cause of literature should
be, so that we could evaluate the different forms in relationship to this
cause; nor that we would have, in fact, no basis for saying that a given
work was an admirable example of its kind, unless we could see the kind
as a related division of the whole. (Winters, 20)

If in fact Crane is willing to make a judgement of a poem in terms of not
only the necessities of its form, but its possibilities it should follow
that he would be willing to make a comparative judgement between different
forms on the same basis, but Crane does not make such a comparison even
at the point in his system where it would seem most reasonable to do so,
the distinction between mimetic and non-mimetic, or didactic poems
(Winters, 20). As Winters points out, these kinds of comparative judge-
ments presuppose an end of poetry other than the end which Crane defines,
"the perfecting of the poem as a beautiful or intrinsically excellent
thing" (Languages, 155).

Winters' analysis of the end of poetry proceeds from the basic
assumption that "... a poem is a statement in words about a human

experience ... [and in each poem] there is a content which is rationally apprehensible, and each work endeavors to communicate the emotion which is appropriate to the rational apprehension of the subject" (Winters, 26). Consequently, inferior writing is not simply a question of execution but of subject, of greater or lesser intensity, generality and inclusiveness of human experience, and "a form, or a sub-form, which enforces any kind of inferior writing is an inferior form ..." (Winters, 27). Winters' ensuing analysis of the kinds of problems which must be studied if we are to estimate the possibilities of any form, and some of the most pressing problems of each, leads him to conclude that the short poem is the highest form:

The shortness of the short poem is due, not to triviality of subject, but rather to the formal principle involved. The other forms which I have been discussing are constructed from the depiction, interrelation, and explanation of many details: that is, they are all, in Crane's sense, imitations of actions. The short poem is not an imitation of action. (Winters, 60)

... The important thing is not action in itself, but the understanding of action. And I respectfully submit that such understanding can be communicated in general terms, and without the details of a particular story .... The master of the short poem is the poet who deals primarily with the understanding of action, and since his medium is verse he can render as fully as possible the total understanding, not merely the rational but the emotional as well. (Winters, 60-61)

The formal principles which Winters' derives from his understanding of the end of literature are two, namely, (1) the distinction between communication through word patterns based on action, detail and concrete depiction and communication through abstract word patterns, the communication of understanding in general terms, and (2), the distinction between prose and verse, on the principle that verse is better suited to communicate the emotional as well as the rational content of human experience. The

critical question which remains is application, that is, to what degree
do evaluative principles of this kind distort our awareness of the value
of the work of art as a thing in itself. But given a reasonable sensitiv-
ity to the individual text, I think Winters' distinctions are useful. One
can conceive of Crane's objections to Winters' hierarchical ordering of
forms on the basis of Winters' 'dialectic' distinctions between 'concrete'
word patterns and 'abstract' word patterns, between prose and verse. This
kind of objection simply illustrates the divergence between Crane's criti-
cal principles and those of Winters. The principle of Winters' criticism
of Crane still remains. Given Crane's definition of the end of poetry,
the kind of criticism he offers can only lead to appreciation and at best
comparisons made through an adequate program of critical and literary
historical study. We need another definition of the end of poetry which
allows us to make distinctions among kinds of forms.

Crane's analysis of <u>Tom Jones</u> from the point of view of the concept
of plot as the first principle of artistic construction leads him to point
out two general faults in the novel:

[first] The narrator, ... though it is well that he should intrude, perhaps
intrudes too much in a purely ornamental way; the introductory essays,
thus, while we would not like to lose them from the canon of Fielding's
writings, serve only occasionally the function of chorus, and the returns
from them, even as embellishment, begin to diminish before the end. [And
secondly] ... the extent of Fielding's reliance, in the novel as a whole,
on techniques of narrative now largely abandoned ... it cannot be denied
that in many chapters where he might better have 'rendered' he merely
'states' .... (<u>Critics</u>, 639)

The significant point is that in the essay these general criticisms are
not substantiated by a detailed analysis. Perhaps it is unfair to expect
Crane to deal with everything in <u>Tom Jones</u> in detail, but his failure to
illustrate at this point, raises the legitimate question, not only of the
validity of these negative judgements, but whether Crane is equipped to

deal adequately with the role of the narrator within his critical frame-work. Crane correctly identifies the importance of the narrator's point of view to establish in the reader "a general frame of mind appropriate to the emotional quality of the story as a whole" (Critics, 641):

[Fielding's narrator] ... is, we perceive, a man we can trust, who knows the whole story and still is not deeply concerned; one who understands the difference between good men and bad, and who can yet speak with amused indulgence of the first, knowing how prone they are to weakness of intel-lect, and with urbane scorn, rather than indignation, of the second, knowing that most of them, too, are fools. This combination of sympathetic moral feeling with ironic detachment is bound to influence our expectations from the first, and to the extent that it does so, we tend to anticipate the coming troubles with no more than comic fear. (Critics, 642)

The method of demonstrating this would be through an analysis of qualities of diction, tone and style, and imagery. It is not that Crane's critical framework excludes this kind of analysis,[21] it is that in this instance, at least, Crane fails to apply these distinctions. This neglect of the verbal quality of the novel, a neglect perhaps best explained as a result of too heavy an emphasis on the non-verbal aspects of the novel, leads Crane to serious error in his evaluation of Fielding's narrator.

The error is not only that Crane fails to perceive that the intro-ductory chapters form a 'plot' of their own which augments the view we have of Fielding's narrator as trustworthy guide. But Crane's pre-occupation with the formal aspects of the novel causes him to neglect those qualities which infuse life into the form itself. Such qualities are best conveyed to the reader through style and diction and through simply exercising them, commenting "on the dramatic materials of Tom's story".[22] Once again, it is not that Crane's critical language, at least potentially, lacks terms to deal with these kinds of distinctions, but that Crane fails to apply them. In his discussion of the particular power of an imitative poem to

affect the reader in a very definite way, Crane makes a distinction between

plots which are based upon an "instinctive pleasure in learning" (the power

of which depends almost exclusively on the pleasure we take in inferring

progressively, from complex or ambiguous signs, the true state of affairs)

and other plots which go beyond this to give us "effects (which) derive

in a much more immediate way from the particular ethical qualities mani-

fested in their agents' actions and thoughts vis-à-vis the human situations

in which they are engaged" (Critics, 621). And in the latter case:

... we cannot help becoming, in a greater or less degree, emotionally
involved; for some of the characters we wish good, for others ill, and,
depending on our inferences as to the events, we feel hope or fear, pity
or satisfaction, or some modification of these or similar emotions. The
peculiar power of any plot of this kind, as it unfolds, is a result of our
state of knowledge at any point in complex interaction with our desires
for the characters as morally differentiated beings; and we may be said
to have grasped the plot in the full artistic sense only when we have
analyzed this interplay of desires and expectations sequentially in re-
lation to the incidents by which it is produced. (Critics, 621-22)

This I take to be a qualitative distinction, suggestive of a way of talking

about those particular interests in a work which relate not only to technique

and form but to subject matter. In Languages of Criticism and the Structure

of Poetry Crane does talk about the concept of 'imitation', as derived from

Aristotle, in terms of the relation of form and technique to subject matter.

Crane argues that 'imitation' as Aristotle conceived it "is brought about

whenever we succeed by means of art in producing an analogue of some natu-

ral process or form, endowed with similar powers to affect other things

or us ..." (Languages, 48). These kind of natural processes are best

described as "patterns recognizably similar to one or another of the

morally determinate patterns of human behavior we are aware of in life"

(Languages, 48). The conception of 'imitation' as a formal principle is

the basis upon which Crane makes the claim that his critical language

exhibits a capacity "to maintain the integrity of literary appreciation without cutting it off formalistically from the life which literary works represent or attempt to guide" (Languages, 189).

The fact that Crane himself anticipates both the general criticism of the theoretical overtones of his essay and the two shortcomings which are evident in his particular evaluation of Fielding's narrator and has articulated them, does not forestall these criticisms of the adequacy of his critical framework:

In his concern with form, he [the critic who would adopt Crane's critical principles] can all too easily become merely formalistic, attending less to what gives life to poems than to the mechanism of their structural parts; in his concern with poetic wholes, he can be tempted to forget that the wholes have no existence apart from the words through which they are made actual; in his concern with the development of a theory, he can readily persuade himself that the enunciation of theory, however well established, is more important than the solution of the concrete problems to which it is relevant and so fall into a methodological pedantry as bad as the factual pedantry of the antiquarians. (Languages, 183)

The difficulty in coming to a conclusion as to the adequacy of Crane's critical language is that although these failings are clearly evident in even the best practical criticism which Crane and others of the Chicago school demonstrate, such failings do not appear to be necessarily failings of principle. It is from this point of view that I intend to consider Wayne C. Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction. If Booth's criticism, which has been generally acknowledged as the best of the Chicago method, can be shown to manifest those particular weaknesses noted by Crane and illustrated by my analysis of both Crane's, Olson's and Maclean's practical criticism -- namely those limitations of a critical language which leads to appreciation rather than evaluation, which neglects the verbal quality of a work of literary art, which is more concerned with the

aesthetics of form than the qualities which give life to that form, and finally, which demonstrates only a secondary concern with the literature itself -- thus the particular value of Crane's critical language may be legitimately questioned. On the other hand, if it can be demonstrated that Booth not only adopts Crane's critical language, but refines it, essentially avoiding the particular weaknesses cited, the positive values of Crane's particular approach to literature may be ascertained.

CHAPTER II

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CRITICAL THEORY OF

R.S. CRANE AND THE RHETORIC OF FICTION BY

WAYNE C. BOOTH

It is generally acknowledged that The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961)

by Wayne C. Booth is the most significant demonstration of the Chicago

method[23] but for the purpose of this thesis it is necessary to substantiate

and define this general observation.

In the first place, a significant number of the initial reviews of

The Rhetoric of Fiction identify Booth as a disciple of R.S. Crane. Andrew

Wright in his article "Man in Charge" (Kenyon Review) notes that "in fact

Booth is not simply the finally-turned product of a fine school; he is his

own man."[24] The South Atlantic Quarterly reviewer, Donald Reiman, paren-

thetically identifies Booth as a "second generation 'Chicago Critic'."[25]

David Lodge, the Modern Language Review critic whose evaluation also appears

on the jacket of The Rhetoric of Fiction makes this pertinent observation:

"This book is dedicated to R.S. Crane, doyen of the Chicago Aristotelians.

It manifest the characteristic virtues of that school of criticism: an

intelligent conservatism which is concerned to accommodate all the

relevant literature in its categories, instead of selecting the kind

of literature which will serve to support a fashionable theory."[26]

One review article, written much later, (College English, 1967) attempts,

in a general way, to substantiate the initial observation of Booth's

indebtedness to Crane. Quite simply, Donald Pizer points out that both in his critical position and method, Booth imitates Crane's earlier opposition to the new criticism:

As Crane reacted against the excessive emphasis on irony in the interpretation of poetry, so Booth resists the stress on ironic impersonal narration in fiction. And as Crane sought to show that the traditional characteristic of plot could serve as the basis for a rich analysis of a novel's theme and form, so Booth seeks to revive the reputation of overt authorial commentary as a subtle and forceful device despite its seeming lack of artifice.[27]

The purpose of Pizer's article is to place The Rhetoric of Fiction in its literary and cultural setting, therefore it is only in this one limited sense that he attempts to establish an identification between Crane and Booth.

In the second place, Booth specifically acknowledges his indebtedness to R.S. Crane and other critics of the Chicago school. The fact that the book is dedicated to R.S. Crane is the first and perhaps the clearest indication of the relationship between Crane and Booth in the book itself. Booth's further acknowledgment to Crane as one of those "who gave detailed criticism to earlier drafts" (preface) specifies the kind of influence Crane has on the writing of Booth's work. In addition, Booth makes two important bibliographical references to R.S. Crane and the Chicago critics. In the annotation which accompanies the reference to The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry Booth clearly states what is to him the particular value of the Chicago method:

Though the 'Chicago critics' have not written much specifically about fiction, their development of Aristotle's method, as one among many valid approaches to criticism, provides what is to me the most helpful, least limiting view of character and event -- those tough realities that have never submitted happily to merely verbal analysis. (Rhetoric, 22, 40 n.)

The second of these is the simple statement which accompanies the bibliographic

reference to Richard McKeon's The Philosophical Bases of Art and Criticism
(first published, Modern Philology, 41-42 (November, 1943 and February,
1944); later published, Critics and Criticism): "the fullest statement
of the critical pluralism on which this book is based" (Rhetoric, n. 53,
403).

In the third place, there is a substantial body of other writings
which complement Booth's bibliographical acknowledgments. A series of
three lectures given by Booth, "How not to use Aristotle The Poetics",
"How to use Aristotle", and "Pluralism and its Rivals", offered at the
University of Chicago (1963, 1968 and 1969, respectively) indicate even
by their titles Booth's unqualified neo-aristotelian stance. (These
lectures are now collected in Now Don't Try to Reason With Me (1970),
103-153). One footnote reference is particularly significant. It is
simply this statement: "Perhaps I should make explicit what I think is
obvious throughout, that in everything I say about this subject I am
greatly indebted to Richard McKeon, Ronald Crane and Elder Olson."[28]
Finally, the particular point I wish to draw from the evidence offered,
Booth's clear dependence upon neo-aristotelian principles of criticism
will be confirmed best by an examination of the text which illustrates
the way in which Booth actually applies the principles he has derived.

The first identifiable quality is Booth's pluralistic and instru=
mental view of criticism. This is clearly demonstrated in his evaluation
of the Chicago method as particularly suited to the analyses of the non=
verbal aspects of fiction, and in the self-recognition of the specific
kind of critical questions which cannot be discussed under the concept
of the 'rhetoric' of fiction (see preface). As a general quality which

is demonstrated in the text, I note that Booth talks about fiction as many things, as a concrete whole, as an 'expression' of the artist's creativity, as communication, as embodying the social and literary forces of its time, and as moral or philosophical statements. Furthermore, within the body of the text Booth incorporates a variety of critical approaches directed toward specific, and limited, ends. For example, Booth relies heavily on autobiographical information and comparison of external texts ('first drafts') in his analyses of the choice of narrative point-of-view in Fitzgerald's Tender is the Night and Joyce's apparent loss of control of the ironies in Portrait of the Artist (cf. Rhetoric, 190-95, 323-36). One may also consider the discussions of the imitators of Fielding and of the formal traditions which lie behind Tristram Shandy from a strictly historical point-of-view as another concrete example of Booth's adoption of pluralistic and instrumental principles (cf. Rhetoric, 218-21, 234-40).

The second identifiable quality is Booth's 'scientific' and practical rather than abstract and dialectic approach to criticism. In the first place, Booth's polemic against abstract and dialectic criticism clearly imitates Crane. His discussion of the critical practise which applies universal qualities to differentiated kinds (Rhetoric, 29-37) leads to this indictment: "a criticism that begins with such general definitions is particularly tempted to move into value judgements without sufficient care about whether those judgements are based on anything more than the initial arbitrary exclusiveness of the general definition" (Rhetoric, 30). The subsequent dismissal of criticism based on general criteria, such as descriptive criticism or thematic criticism, which has little or no relevance to technical questions, is supported by a

specific reference to Crane's attack on those modern critics who discount distinctions among literary kinds (Rhetoric, 36, n. 26). The necessary corrective to this kind of general criticism is a hypothetical approach to literary problems. Booth lauds this approach in Flaubert's criticism -- "Flaubert recognized the tension between what might be desirable in general and what is possible in the particular case" (Rhetoric, 24); in Fielding's "emphasis on the peculiar qualities dictated by the kind of work he sought to create" (Rhetoric, 34), and in Dryden's recognition that "... some technical procedures are better for this kind of play, some for that" (Rhetoric, 35). The principle demonstrated by these critics is that the relation between general criteria which imply conflicting technical choices or between general criteria and particular requirements relative to an individual work, should be expressed in "hypothetical rather than categorical form" (Rhetoric, 40). Booth specifically demonstrates this practical and scientific bias to critical problems in his development of the argument for the understanding and use of the 'outmoded' literary devices of direct commentary. He argues "it should prove more worthwhile to abandon such a priori judgements [that direct commentary is an unqualified literary fault, and that the good novelist attempts to efface the omniscient narrator] and to look into some good novels to discover the effects commentary has in fact been used to achieve ...".[29] The claim for this kind of approach to the particular problem cited is modest, but important: "We should at least be in a position to decide with some precision whether any of the particular achievements of the author's voice have been worth the sacrifice of whatever general qualities we hold dear" (Rhetoric, 169).

In the second place, the kind of questions about a work of art which Booth considers most important are those kind of questions which by their very nature require a hypothetical and practical approach. "To what extent did his choice of technique aid or hinder him in his effort to realize the inherent possibilities of the work?" (Rhetoric, 362) or, in another context, "what are the kind of interests that novelists have, in fact rather than in theory, played upon in constructing their works?" (Rhetoric, 23-24) may be offered as examples of these kind of questions. In conclusion of this point, I would note that Booth makes an explicit claim to the 'hypothetical', scientific or practical approach to criticism, an approach which he notes is exemplified by Aristotle:

I can only say that what I have tried to do, so far, is to preserve with some rigor the structure of hypothetical argument which I find most common in effective practical critics, from Aristotle to the present: [for example] If an author wants intense sympathy for characters who do not have strong virtues to recommend them, then the psychic vivid-ness of prolonged and deep inside views will help him .... Let each work do what it 'wants' to do; let its author discover its inherent powers and guage his techniques to the realization of these powers. (Rhetoric, 377-78)

The third identifiable quality is Booth's adherence to the Aristotelian concept of the artistic whole. This is stated in the clearest possible way:

Most of us can accept the essential poetic truth first formulated by Aristotle -- that each successful imaginative work has its own life, its own soul, its own principles of being quite independently of the prejudices or practical needs of this or that audience, and that our poetic devices should be an "integral part of the whole." [And as a necessarily correlative] He [Aristotle] wanted the greatest possible effect appropriate to [the whole] not the most rigorous adherence to abstract rules .... (Rhetoric, 93, 94)

Furthermore, this principle is implicit in the central concept of Booth's critical approach, the concept of 'rhetoric'. 'rhetoric' in the 'small r'

sense of the word designate the techniques employed by a novelist to
achieve a particular effect, but 'Rhetoric' in the 'capital R' sense of
the word implies the principle of art as communication of the particular
effect which the 'rhetoric', any identifiable technical device, is made
to serve. Booth's failure either to differentiate consistently or define
adequately the implicit relationship between the two meanings of the word
leads to unnecessary confusion. In an important self-critical essay
Booth acknowledges this:

The book's major fault, which I still would not quite know how to remove,
lies in the confusion of focus between rhetoric as what I called "the
more easily recognizable appeals to the reader" (rhetoric as overt tech-
nical maneuver) and rhetoric as the whole art of fiction, viewed in the
rhetorical mode. A defense of the different forms of 'telling' could be
made, I think, from almost any critical position. But I have tried to
make it from two quite different positions, and I supported my move by
stretching and contracting at will the area covered by the term rhetoric.
"Even if there are permanent, universal responses embodied in the work,
then, they are unlikely to move us strongly and they may be unclear --
without the author's rhetoric" (Rhetoric, 113). What does the word
embodied in this sentence mean? According to my expanded definition of
rhetoric, any act of embodiment can be treated as rhetoric. Yet the
phrase "the author's rhetoric" at the end of the sentence seems to mean
simply overt rhetoric, like commentary and obvious technical manipulations.
On the other hand, it means whatever the author does to make his 'embodiment'
clear to the reader -- but the 'embodiment' itself serves to do that.[30]

Perhaps Booth is too hard on himself, for this confusion disappears if one
considers each identifiable rhetorical device as directed toward a specific
'Rhetorical' end, the communication of a particular effect, identifiable
as the artistic intention. 'Rhetoric' in the large sense does not pre-
clude the purification of 'rhetoric' in the narrower sense (Rhetoric,
109ff), on this principle, that "the kind of rhetoric (in the narrower
sense) required will depend on the precise relation between the detail
of action or character to be judged and the nature of the whole in which
it occurs"(Rhetoric, 183).

The particular advantage of an 'expandable' and 'contractable' concept of rhetoric is that those prejorative distinctions between "distinguishable rhetoric," for example, direct commentary and "the disguised rhetoric of modern fiction" (Rhetoric, preface) and pure form, disappear. Since the artist is viewed as "making readers" rather than as "making a concrete form", everything he does can be seen as 'rhetorical' ("The Rhetoric of Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions", 160-61). It is not that Booth sees the 'poetics' of fiction (the formal principles of construction) as incompatible with a 'rhetoric' of fiction; they can be seen as interdependent.[31] Nor is it that Booth regards the rhetorical mode as the only valid approach to fiction. However, fiction as rhetoric does provide a useful approach to certain critical problems, in particular the problems of the 'intrusion' of the author's voice, and does yield several fruitful distinctions. Therefore, from a pluralistic and instrumental stance, Booth's avowed critical stance, it is possible to justify such a 'vague' definition of rhetoric.[32] Secondly, there is no necessary distinction between 'Rhetoric', what a work communicates in communicating itself (not themes or norms), ("The Rhetoric of Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions, 163) and 'rhetoric', how the work attempts to communicate. Quite simply, Booth's language of rhetoric allows him to talk about 'content values' in terms of technique.

The central question about The Rhetoric of Fiction is what are the particular advantages or limitations of a critical language which deals with fiction as 'rhetoric', a critical language derived in the manner demonstrated above from the basic neo-aristotelian concepts of Crane's critical framework? Implicit in this question is the particular

one with which this thesis is concerned, namely, to what degree is Booth's criticism a successful demonstration of the Chicago method? The proper approach to these two inter-related questions is an identification and analysis of only those critical concepts arising out of a rhetorical language which directly touch upon the weaknesses demonstrated in Crane's practical criticism. The fact that these particular concepts are each central to Booth's critical language is not merely convenient; it is a further illustration of the inter-relation of the two critical frameworks.

CHAPTER III

THE RHETORIC OF FICTION: A DEMONSTRATION OF THE

CRITICAL PRINCIPLES OF R.S. CRANE

Booth's appreciation of the Chicago method as one particularly

suited to the analysis of character and event, the distinctly non-verbal

aspects of fiction, and his emphasis upon the non-verbal basis of fiction[33]

potentially led to the same shortcomings in practical criticism which Crane

demonstrates in his failure to understand the role of the narrator in Tom

Jones. Yet Booth successfully avoids Crane's specific error, indeed,

corrects Crane (Rhetoric, 215-18). The reason is quite simply that Booth's

critical language includes a concept which allows him to deal with those

artistic qualities particular to the verbal character of a novel, as con-

veyed through the act of narration. This concept is the 'implied author'.

The term 'implied author' is an all-inclusive one, relating directly

to our concept of the work as a whole:

Our sense of the implied author includes not only the extractable meanings
but also the moral and emotional content of each bit of action and suffer-
ing of all the characters. It includes, in short, the intuitive apprehen-
sion of a completed artistic whole; the chief value to which this implied
author is committed, regardless of what party his creator belongs to in
real life, is that which is expressed by the total form. (Rhetoric, 73-74)

It is particularly suited to talking about the author without obviously

committing the 'intentional fallacy' -- "we find a middle position between

the technical irrelevance of talk about the artist's objectivity and the

harmful error of pretending that an author can allow direct intrusions of

his own immediate problems and desires" (Rhetoric, 75). But more importantly,

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the term designates a formal concept by which we can incorporate our awareness of the unique influence of the author's explicit verbal character and event.

Booth identifies two other terms, namely, style, tone, "which are sometimes used to name the core of norms and choices which I am calling the 'implied author'" (Rhetoric, 74). Style adequately describes our sense "from word to word and line to line, that the author sees more deeply and judges more profoundly than his presented characters," but "... in carrying such strong overtones of the merely verbal, the word style excludes our sense of the author's skill in his choice of character and episode, scene and idea" (Rhetoric, 74). Similarly, tone indicates "the implicit evaluation which the author manages to convey behind his explicit presentation" (Rhetoric, 74), but again, the reference is strictly verbal. The concept of the implied author includes the 'sum' of the artistic choices which go into work (Rhetoric, 75); therefore it applies equally well to choices made on the verbal level only or choices made at other levels of plot, character and thought.

There are specific instances in Booth's analyses of particular writers which focus upon the kind of choices made on the verbal level. These may be offered as demonstrations of Booth's sensitivity to the verbal quality of a work and as examples of the fact that Booth's critical language does not exclude the possibility of making valid critical judgements at this level. First, Booth notes that the particular problems of interpretation in both James' "The Liar" and "The Aspern Papers", are clarified in later textual revisions. Particular changes in choice of words and phrases are noted, but in the second instance Booth concludes

that even these revisions do not solve the problems inherent in the

incompatible demands imposed upon the narrator of "The Aspern Papers"

(Rhetoric, 347-54; 354-64). The second example and one which especially

illustrates Booth's improvement over Crane is the discussion of 'Fielding'

in Tom Jones. Those qualities conveyed through 'Fielding's' explicit

comment on the events of Tom's life, "creative power, wisdom, learning

and benevolence" (Rhetoric, 218) go beyond plot and character analyses

to create a character of the implied author who fully "dominates our

reaction to the whole" (Rhetoric, 215). Booth's subsequent analysis of

the specific techniques which distinguish Fielding from his imitators

(as well as his later analysis of 'Shandian commentary', 234-40) illus-

trate the critical requirements by which the verbal quality of a work

may be judged -- "appropriateness to a context and usefulness within

that context" (Rhetoric, 235). Admittedly, such requirements seem too

general, but the simple problem is that although style and manner must

be 'self-justifying' or at least 'interesting' in some way, "there is

no general quality of style ... that must be in all works of the same

form" (Rhetoric, 204; also see Booth's preceding analyses of Poe's "House

of Usher" and Melville's "Benito Cereno", 201-204). Booth solves this

difficulty by relating the general concept of style to the more dis-

criminating concept of the implied author.[34]

Style and tone are seen as one manifestation of the character

of the implied author, but only one. The character of the implied author

is demonstrated equally well in his choice of events as in those sections

which lend themselves to stylistic analysis, for example, commentary.

This is the critical principle behind Booth's illustrative analysis of

Lady Chatterley's Lover by D.H. Lawrence. The failure of Lawrence's novel is that the explicit judgement he passes on some of his characters is not justified by the dramatized facts (Rhetoric, 79). "What we object to," Booth claims, "is the Lawrence implied by some of the drama, not necessarily the Lawrence given in the commentary" (Rhetoric, 80). There is no implication, as there clearly is in Crane's analysis, that one level of choice formally precedes the other; the only criteria is harmony between the two levels of choice.

The second major criticism of Crane's critical framework which Booth anticipates and corrects is the tendency in an adherence to the formal principles of a poem to the neglect of the qualities which give life to that form. It is precisely at this point that Booth notes an important distinction between a formal critical language (a 'poetics') and a rhetorical one:

In place of analyses of poetic form, descriptions and interpretations of types of action or plot ... I look at effects, at techniques for producing them, and at readers and inferences. In place of classification of literary kinds, I give an analysis of interests and (as in the Emma chapter) manipulations of interests. In place of an analysis into the poetic elements of internal structure (plot, character, thought, diction) my elements become identical with the three one finds in all rhetorics, author, work, audience: authors and their various surrogates and spokesman; works, and their various arrangements for effect; audiences, and their preconceptions and processes of inferences. ("The Rhetoric of Fiction and the 'Poetics' of Fictions", 163)

The terms and relations by which Booth evaluates fiction as rhetoric have this correspondence to the terms and relations of a poetics of fiction -- they represent the qualities which lie behind the principles of form. This correspondence is never directly stated in The Rhetoric of Fiction but it is consistently implied. Perhaps one illustration of the kind of implication I suggest will clarify this point. In the discussion which

introduces the notion of practical interests Booth argues: "But the fact remains that what I am calling practical interests, and particularly moral qualities as inferred from character choices or as stated directly by the author, have always been an important basis of literary form" (Rhetoric, 130). This example has the additional importance of suggesting the particular relationship between interests and literary form which Booth is especially concerned with: what is the relation between moral judgement and technical decisions? An analysis of these terms and relations, namely, the concept of interests and beliefs and the manipulation of these qualities to achieve certain effects will show that Booth's critical language allows him to talk about not only the formal aspects of the novel, but those qualities which infuse life into form.

If Booth is to deal with fiction as 'rhetoric', in terms of the effects implied by the formal principles of the work rather than formal principles themselves ("The Rhetoric of Fiction and the 'Poetics' of Fictions", 163) then some concept of interest seems inevitable. Booth's development of the notion of interests provides a useful way of talking about this aspect of literary experience without falling into the 'affective fallacy' of "trying to derive the standard of criticism from the psychological effects of the poem and ending in impressionism or realism".[35] Even Wimsatt, the severest critic of the Chicago school, admits that "Neither the intentionalism nor the affectivism of the Chicago critics ever, I believe, assumes such rampant forms as Monroe Beardsley and I have been concerned to identify" (Wimsatt, 64). Although there is certainly a wrong way of talking about the legitimate responses a reader makes in reading a work, Booth is equally correct in pointing out that the categorical

rejection of interests is just as fatal to our appreciation of the work (Rhetoric, 133). The categorical rejection of interests can lead to a barren formalist analysis of the work.

Booth delineates three kinds of interests which the reader will recognize and "which are thus available for technical manipulation in fiction" (Rhetoric, 125). They are intellectual or cognitive, qualitative and practical interests. Under the first category Booth includes the "desire to discover the truth about the world of the book," whether it is "the simple material circumstances, as in most mystery stories, or the psychological or philosophical truths which explain the external circumstance" (Rhetoric, 123-23) which compells the reader's interest. The second category, qualitative interests, loosely defines the reader's interest in the formal or aesthetic qualities of a work. Practical interests, the third and last kind of interests Booth classifies, delineates the reader's emotional involvement with characters who are recognized as morally differentiating beings:

Any characteristics, mental, physical, or moral which in real life will make me love or hate other men will work the same effect in fiction .... what I am calling practical interests, and particularly moral qualities as inferred from character choices or as directly stated by the author, have always been an important basis for literary form. (Rhetoric, 130)

Quite understandably, the reader reacts strongly to obvious manipulations of these kinds of interest. We call such works 'melodramatic', but there are legitimate sources of practical interest -- interest which one is not ashamed to respond to. One of the best of these is "the spectacle of a good man facing moral choices that are important" (Rhetoric, 131). The development of this category of practical interests with particular atten-
tion to moral interest is something which is clearly implicit in Crane's

discussion of the plot of Tom Jones. In his self-critical essay on The Rhetoric of Fiction, Booth acknowledges that Crane's critical language "had a way of talking about effects on readers and audiences .... But, though an effect on audiences was implied by its form, the critic pursued the internal nature of a poem by analyzing its parts in relation to the whole" ("The Rhetoric of Fiction and the 'Poetics' of Fictions", 162-63). Booth's discussion of practical interests may be seen as an expansion of a critical principle which Crane devised, but did not fully apply.

The discussion of interests does not lead Booth to compartmentalization and hierarchical ordering of the reader's response. He is clear that this is precisely what our experience with literature "teaches us not to do" (Rhetoric, 134). However, a critical difficulty does arise, not that a work will include too few interests, but "that the pursuit of secondary interests may diminish interests that the author most desires" (Rhetoric, 134). ('Primary' and 'secondary' interests are distinguished in relation to the author's intention; there is no interest which is inherently prior to another.) Furthermore, "some of the particular interests under each type are incompatible with each other and with some types of rhetoric [technique]" (Rhetoric, 134). The prime example of this kind of critical problem is the one which faces an author who wants "to cultivate the reader's interest in the quality of ambiguity ... and at the same time convey the full intellectual pleasure of gratified curiosity or use fully the reader's moral and emotional interests" (Rhetoric, 135). Clearly, both interests cannot be fully developed in the same work, and the particular instance Booth discusses is an important one:

If I am to rejoice, for example, in Stephen's flight into exile as a final sign of his growth into the true artist, I cannot at the same time delight fully in his creator's cleverness in leaving the meaning of that flight

ambigious; the more ambiguity the less triumph. (Rhetoric, 135; also see
Booth's application of this critical principle in his extended analysis
of A Portrait of the Artist, 323-36)

The importance of the particular example chosen by Booth for his illus-

trative analysis is that it does indicate his particular polemic against

the interest in ambiguity, and the technical devices employed to achieve

this quality in a novel. But even at this point Booth does not attempt

to establish a hierarchy of interests. The critical concept implied is

that of 'sacrifice' -- the author must choose which interests or qualities

are most important to the effect he wishes to achieve and such a choice

necessarily implies the 'sacrifice' of other qualities or interests.

Booth therefore concludes:

There is a pleasure from learning the simple truth, and there is a pleasure
from learning that the truth is not simple. Both are legitimate sources
of literary effect, but they cannot both be realized to the full simulta-
neously. In this respect, as in all others, the artist must choose,
consciously or unconsciously. To write one kind of book is always to
some extent a repudiation of other kinds. (Rhetoric, 136)

The concept of belief arises from the concept of practical inter-

ests and bears the same relationship to questions of form and technique.

Although Booth fails to make the connection explicit, it is reasonable to

say that the reader's awareness of the morally differentiating characters

of the work lead the reader to deduce from the choices and actions of these

characters, the values implicit. The notion which Booth never quite makes

clear is that our practical interests involve the reader at the moral

level. Booth's discussion of a passage from The Old Wife's Tale by

Arnold Bennett, (an analysis intended to illustrate the operations of

belief) begins thus:

What strikes one most obviously here are the "practical interests." If
we are to react to Sophia's great mistake as Bennett obviously intends,
we must first of all feel contempt for Gerald ... he is contemptible

throughout, and it is obvious that we cannot enjoy the dramatic irony of this scene if we do not feel mistrust and contempt for him.   (Rhetoric, 145)

And further in this passage:

Thus, our ethical evaluation of the two characters is essential to the passage and to the book as a whole. (Rhetoric, 146)

This involvement at the moral level engages the problem that critics have called 'literature and belief'.

Booth's postulate that there is a general concurrence that our "enjoyment of literature as literature, and not as propaganda, inevitably involves our beliefs" (Rhetoric, 139), is sound. Again, Booth is correct in pointing out that "it is only when a work seems explicitly doctrinaire, or when reasonable men can be in serious disagreement about its values, that the question of belief arises for discussion" (Rhetoric, 142). The more common experience is that the reader willingly suspends his disbeliefs, and as he reads becomes "the self whose beliefs must coincide with the author's .... The author creates, in short, an image of himself and another image of his reader; he makes his reader, as he makes his second self, and the most successful reading is one in which the created selves, author and reader, can find complete agreement" (Rhetoric, 138). If the reader cannot accept, even hypothetically, the 'attitudes' or 'beliefs' upon which the book depends (Rhetoric, 138), or if the technique obscures those values which are in abeyance and those which are important (Rhetoric, 144), then the work suffers.

The critical concept which relates practical interests to beliefs to Booth's central evaluative principle, the image the 'implied author' creates of himself,[36] is the concept of distance. Distance is a formal concept by which Booth distinguishes types of narration:

In any reading experience there is an implied dialogue among author,
narrator, the other characters, and the reader. Each of the four can
range, in relation to each other, from identification to complete oppo-
sition, on any axis of value, moral, intellectual, aesthetic and even
physical. (Rhetoric, 155)

Those aspects included under our general definition of aesthetic distance,

are not neglected but neither are they to be confused "with the equally

important effects of personal beliefs and qualities, in author, reader,

narrator, and all others in the cast of characters" (Rhetoric, 156).

Booth applies the concept of distance primarily to the beliefs and quali-

ties implicit in the above relations. These relations are briefly outlined

by Booth: the narrator may be more or less distant from the implied author,

from the characters in the stories he tells or from the reader's own norms;

the implied author may be more or less distant from the reader, or (carry-

ing the reader with him) from the other characters, on any axis of value

(Rhetoric, 156-58). Of the relations described the most important for

practical criticism is the distance "between the fallible or unreliable

narrator and the implied author who carries the reader with him in judging

the narrator" (Rhetoric, 158). This statement is the logical conclusion

of the relationships between questions of form and technique, and questions

of beliefs and moral judgements which are implicit in the development of

the concepts of interests, beliefs, distance and the implied author.

Form and technique are related to interest and beliefs in such

a way that whenever human experience is formed into a work of art, the

reader is drawn toward the characters in a human way. These kinds of

interests are called practical interests, and the kind of formal relation

they exhibit is analogous to the neo-aristotelian concept of 'imitation'.

(See my discussion of 'imitation' in relation to the plot of Tom Jones

above, 45.) The particular nature of these practical interests is that

they involve the moral judgements implicit in human activity. The quality

of these moral judgements is defined by the author either through direct

commentary or through other devices of indirect evaluation.[37] These moral

judgements constitute the beliefs of the implied author, and while it is

at least theoretically possible that the implied author's beliefs may be

so far removed from the reader's experience and attitude that no amount

of rhetorical craftsmanship can overcome this basic incompatibility, the

usual experience is that the reader accepts the implied author's belief

within the terms of the novel. However, it is possible that the reader

may be confused about the beliefs which seem to be implied in the work.

Furthermore, this confusion is a technical problem, specifically a con-

fusion of distance, rather than any basic 'incompatibility' of moral

outlook.

The particular confusion which Booth is concerned about arises

when there is a difference between the beliefs of the narrator and the

beliefs of the implied author. This kind of confusion is different from

the effects of deliberate confusion, the purpose of which would be a

polemic against conventional moral or spiritual values in an attempt to

establish a radically new moral basis, or to show that there is in fact

no moral basis. Deliberate confusion directed toward these ends is a

legitimate though limiting artistic endeavour and depends upon "a nearly

complete union of the narrator and the reader in a common endeavour, with

the author silent and invisible but implicitly concurring, perhaps even

sharing the narrator's plight" (Rhetoric, 300). On the other hand, those

novels which depend upon the reader's awareness of a discrepancy between

the beliefs of the narrator and those of the implied author lose their full effect if the author's 'silence' and 'invisibility' is misconstrued as implicit acceptance of the narrator's beliefs. The implied author and the reader must often 'co-operate' in making the moral judgements upon which the total effect of the work depends. While this kind of co-operation, 'collaboration' or 'secret communion' as Booth calls it, can be one of the most rewarding of literary experiences (Rhetoric, 307), there are instances in which the reader is almost totally confused as to the kind of judgements he is intended to make upon a narrator who appears to be in some sense divorced from the norms of the implied author.

These instances of total confusion are identified by the kind of critical controversy which attaches to them. On the one hand critical controversy over a particular work may reflect complexity and depth in that work, and as such enriches our appreciation of the work. On the other hand critical controversy may be traceable to artistic defects. Although the distinction may be hard to make, the attempt is necessary, and if successful, can lead to important critical awareness. Given the almost overwhelming confusion of beliefs in those novels which follow the Jamesian tradition of impersonal narration Booth turns his attention to those technical deficiencies which account for the failure of the reader to make an adequate moral judgement upon the work -- adequate in the sense of at least deciphering the moral values the implied author intends.

The confusion of the distance between the implied author's beliefs and those ascribed to the narrator is most marked in the novel which employs the device of impersonal narration. There are examples of this

kind in our literary tradition and Booth turns briefly to these in order

to ascertain the kinds of technical failures which have contributed to

confusion of distance, particularly on a moral axis. Three are cited:

there is no warning (of irony), either explicitly or in the form of gross
disparity of word and deed; the relation of the ironic narrator to the
author's norms is an extremely complex one, and the norms are themselves
private; and the narrator's own mental vitality dominates the scene and
wins our sympathy. (Rhetoric, 324)

In the first instance, if the reader is unaware that irony is operating,

he will not be compelled to "move behind the overt beliefs of the narrator

to the implicit beliefs of the author" (Rhetoric, 317). This failure can

lead to gross misunderstanding of the artist's intention, as in the case

of Defoe's realistic impersonation of the fanatical Tory in his pamphlet

"The Shortest Way with the Dissenters". Booth argues that the problem

with Defoe's pamphlet is that "there is no statement within the pamphlet

of a positive program which, if read properly, would reveal the true

position of the author" (Rhetoric, 319). The second instance is simply

that "whenever an impersonal author asks us to infer subtle differences

between his narrator's norms and his own, we are likely to have trouble"

(Rhetoric, 321). The value of subtleties and ambiguities must be weighed

against the value of effective communication of a simpler message. The

third instance is common to the modern 'streams-of-consciousness' novels

and in itself is "capable of blinding us to the possibility of making

judgements not shared by the narrator or reflector himself" (Rhetoric,

324). But if this third technique is combined with the devices of imper-

sonal and unreliable narration, the moral norms of the implied author can

be impossibly obscured. Booth therefore concludes that "impersonal

narration has raised moral difficulties too often for us to dismiss

moral questions as irrelevant to technique" (Rhetoric, 378).

The importance of Booth's discussion of beliefs is that the implied author's moral beliefs are finally discussed in terms of the techniques, the 'rhetoric' by which they are conveyed. Booth has clearly taken sides in the traditional debate of the moral character of literature. He explicitly repudiates the claim that moral judgements are inappropriate to the novel -- "when the narrator judges, how is the reader to avoid judging?" (Rhetoric, 382) In the light of the nihilistic culmination of "more than a hundred years of experimentation with inside views and the sympathetic identification they can yield," Booth asks, "But is this really what we go to literature for? Quite aside from the question of how such a book might affect readers who already have homicidal tendencies, is there no limit to what we will praise, provided it is done with skill?" (Rhetoric, 384) Finally, not only does Booth decry the loss of moral consensus and the loss of the artist's responsibility for it, he implicitly defines what that consensus should be, and how the artist is responsible for creating it (Rhetoric, 395 ff). Such a call for discernible positive values in fiction clearly indicates a personal conservative moral temper. One may take a clue from the title of the last chapter of the book, "The Morality of Impersonal Narration", and correctly identify The Rhetoric of Fiction as a moral polemic. Donald Pizer notes that this is in fact what most of the initial reviewers of The Rhetoric of Fiction have done, and with the exception of Peter Swiggart ("Mr. Booth's Quarrel with Fiction") they have seen this as a positive element in the book (Pizer, 472).

If one grants that The Rhetoric of Fiction is in fact a moral

polemic the debate over the adequacy of the particular judgements in one

sense, seems to be beside the point. Peter Swiggart describes Booth's

moral argument as "a quarrel with fiction", whereas Donald Pizer claims

it as rather "a quarrel with the modern temper" (Pizer, 475). Pizer argues

that Booth seems completely unable to appreciate the vast amount of contem-

porary fiction which "combines a depiction of the destructiveness of modern

life with a lack of certainty about alternatives" (Pizer, 474). For example,

Booth fails to consider the rather dominant motif of the quest of the anti-

hero -- "a motif embodying both a rejection of value and a search for value

in which the only contractual understanding between author and reader is

that moral norms are untrustworthy" (Pizer, 474). Booth has legitimately

replied that "To discover that I admire many great works that are both

ambiguous and ironic and -- to some degree -- unclear, the reader would

have to go back through the earlier chapters with perhaps more care than

one has a right to expect from one's readers" ("The Rhetoric of Fiction

and the 'Poetics' of Fictions", 167). But to argue that Booth deals with

the question of the moral character of literature with some degree of

sophistication is only a reply to the charge that his personal moral

values do not seriously interfere with his particular judgements. It is

no reply to the charge that the moral question is plainly inappropriate

to a study of literature. Booth admits that "It may be finally impossible

to deal in rational argument with such a position. It is like trying to

dissuade a friend from suicide: Where do you find your first premise?"

(Rhetoric, 385)

If one will grant the 'first premise', that moral judgement is

appropriate to literature, then the question of the adequacy of particular

moral judgements is an important one. Furthermore, if the critic does
indicate a strong adherence to conservative moral values, then it is
reasonable to ask whether or not such a bias does in fact become a pre-
judice, thereby distorting his evaluation of a work. Although there is
no doubt that Booth is morally conservative, it is equally clear to me
that this conservatism does not, within reason, distort the particular
judgements he makes. The reason, I believe, is that Booth finally relates
all moral judgements to a discussion of technique. There is no necessary
distinction between the moral quality of ideas presented and the quality
of presentation (Swiggart, 147). It is not true that Booth is more con-
cerned with what is communicated than with how it is communicated (Pizer,
475). Booth does not require that the work communicate themes or norms;
he requires that the work communicate itself ("The Rhetoric of Fiction
and the 'Poetics' of Fictions", 163). "Let each work do what it 'wants'
to do;" Booth writes, "let its author discover its inherent powers and
gauge his techniques to the realization of those powers" (Rhetoric, 378).
There is no necessary separation between 'Rhetoric' in the sense of the
author's overall intent -- moral intention may be included, in fact, in
The Rhetoric of Fiction it is specified -- and 'rhetoric' in terms of
the particular techniques used to communicate this intent. Thus the
critical question is not in any sense what the author should write, but
"whether an author has an obligation to write well in the sense of making
his moral orderings clear ..." (Rhetoric, 386).

The aesthetic obligation upon the artist to 'write well' in the
sense of doing "all that is possible in any given instance to realize his
world as he intends it", also implies that "there is a moral dimension in

the author's choice of impersonal, noncommittal techniques" (Rhetoric, 388).
"As we have seen," Booth argues, "objective narration, particularly when
conducted through a highly unreliable narrator, offers special temptations
to the reader to go astray. Even when it presents characters whose conduct
the author deeply deplores, it presents them through the seductive medium
of their own self-defending rhetoric" (Rhetoric, 389). To this point the
only 'morality' Booth ascribes is the 'aesthetic morality' -- to 'write
well' does not necessarily "import into our claim the concept of a worth-
while purpose" (Rhetoric, 388). But Booth argues that this one device of
impersonal narration does have a moral effect on the reader. "Perhaps a
majority of all charges against the immorality of serious modern fiction
can be traced to this one device," he suggests (Rhetoric, 379). The reason
for this response in the modern reader is neither in "any inherent condition
of the novel" nor "from any incompatibility between author and reader"
(Rhetoric, 390). The moral confusion the reader reacts against "comes from
the reader's inability to dissociate himself from a vicious center of conscious-
ness presented to him with all of the seductive self-justification of skill-
ful rhetoric" (Rhetoric, 390).

Booth acknowledges that in moving toward a definition of such moral
confusion, he is moving into the area of "choosing among effects" (Rhetoric,
378). Clearly, at this point Booth goes beyond Crane. Crane's critical
language was suited particularly to the determination of effects, for
'appreciation', but provided no means for evaluation, choosing among effects."
If the reader reacts to the work of art as a beautiful thing in itself, then
appreciation is the legitimate end of criticism, but if the reader reacts as
Booth would, "with our whole being" then "judgements of ends as well as
means" is inevitable (Rhetoric, 378).

Booth's essential argument is that different techniques are suited to different effects and that the choice of technique implies a choice among effects. The artist has an aesthetic obligation to choose those techniques which best serve the intended effect. But, given the relationship between technique and effect, the artist's aesthetic obligation takes on a moral dimension. If the artist chooses the wrong technique he can obscure the moral effect of the book. In particular the device of impersonal narration has lead to confusion of moral purposes. The fact that Booth only applies his evaluative principle to the question of reliable and unreliable narration is a clear limitation of the polemical nature of his book, the defense of direct commentary, but the principle is, I believe, applicable to other instances.

The first major criticism of Crane, namely, that his analysis fails to fully account for the verbal quality of a work is anticipated and corrected in Booth's practical criticism by the development of the concept of the implied author. Booth's discussion of practical interest and beliefs is an expansion of Crane's concept of 'imitation' and thus answers the second criticism of Crane, that Crane is more concerned with the aesthetics of form than the qualities which give life to that form. The third major criticism of Crane, namely, that given his definition of the end of poetry Crane's critical system can only lead to critical appreciation is also anticipated and corrected by Booth. Booth shows that if one regards the end of poetry as 'making readers' as well as 'making a perfect form', it is possible to move from a discussion of the techniques of a work to the effects of the work and to make an evaluative judgement of the moral effect of the work without violating the autonomy

of the work.

The fourth general criticism of Crane which applies also to Booth is whether the emphasis given to critical theory detracts from the value of the practical criticism. Yvor Winters concedes the correctness of Crane's limited practical criticism, the account of the plot of Macbeth and the analysis of the plot of Tom Jones, but points out that the latter seems to be no more than a "workmanlike job on a very simple subject" (Winters, 22). Crane's practical criticism is at best 'conventional', that is, he deals only with recognized masterpieces, Fieldings' Tom Jones, Grey's Elegy and Austen's Persuasion. The reason for this is clear: Crane's practical criticism serves as a demonstration of critical theory and very little of it if any exists for the sake of literature itself. The pattern suggests a serious academic limitation in Crane's approach, namely, a particular weakness in making value judgements. What Leavis says of T.S. Eliot may also be applied to Crane: "although Eliot is aware of technical faults, he is unaware of the profounder criticisms."[38]

In this particular respect Booth clearly shows an improvement on Crane. Booth is able to extend his analysis of form and technique to include a discussion of moral qualities, beliefs and interests. Furthermore, Booth discusses a wide range of novels with sensitivity and care. But Booth also admits:

Careful as I have tried to be, I know that experts in each period or author are sure to find errors of fact or interpretation that no expert would commit. But I hope that my larger argument does not stand or fall on whether the reader agrees with all of my analyses. They are intended as illustrative, not definitive, and though the book includes, I think, some contributions to the reading of individual works, each critical conclusion could have been illustrated with many other works. (Rhetoric, preface)

As with Crane, Booth's practical criticism exists ultimately for the sake of the general theory and not for its own sake.

Is this the proper priority? To put it quite baldly, do we need Booth's rather elaborate critical framework in order to get at the particular practical problems he discusses? Marius Bewley (The Complex Fate) gets at the problem of James' "The Liar" without any apparent need of Booth's concept of fiction as rhetoric. F.R. Leavis in "The Orthodoxy of Enlightenment" (Anna Karenina and Other Essays) discusses the essential fault in Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, again without the need of Booth's system. Nor is the central polemic of The Rhetoric of Fiction, the aesthetic justification of direct commentary, unique in academic discussions. One may compare F.R. Leavis on George Eliot's Middlemarch (The Great Tradition) or "The Old Novel and the New" by Martin Steinman in this regard. General theory does have legitimate application -- it enables the critic to deal with a certain range of particular problems -- but theory should serve the art, and not art the theory. Booth's rather elaborate critical framework does suggest one way of getting at the particular problems which Bewley and Leavis arrive at independently; furthermore, the particular problems can be related and further implications of this relationship can be shown. However, a critical theory is not a 'machine' which 'cranks out' correct answers. In so far as Booth applies his method in this manner he may be faulted, but in so far as he applies his own critical theory in a pluralistic and instrumental manner he is not at fault. The distinction is hard to make, and probably only can be made in relation to specific criticisms of individual works. Given "a certain flexibility of mind, a sensitivity to literary particulars,

an ability to resist the spirit of routine and self-satisfaction, and an understanding of the right relation between methods and problems", I agree, with Crane, that the critic can avoid the fault of too easily persuading himself that "the enunciation of theory, however well established, is more important than the solution of the concrete problems" (Languages, 182, 183).

Perhaps a more general reply to whether or not one 'needs' Booth's critical system may be made in terms of an understanding of the value of literary criticism. I think that we read literary criticism so that we may better understand a particular work, not so much in reference to the expertise of the particular statement, but in reference to the adequacy of the particular question. The critic's proper hope is that the question will apply not only to the particular work, but to other works as well, and if so, then we have a useful way of approaching, on our own, other works. We do not read critics of demonstrated sensitivity and perception in order to 'copy' them, but in order to understand the principles upon which they base their questions. Perhaps 'critical framework' is too rigid a term to apply to a description of these basic principles because many critics make no attempt to elucidate the relationship between the values they seek in literature and the questions they ask in order to get at them. But the study of these principles and relations is the first step toward independent evaluation of literature. In an essay entitled "Is There Any Knowledge That a Man Must Have? (The Knowledge Most Worth Having) Booth argues that the kind of education that a man must have is, traditionally, a liberal education, that is, one that is intended to liberate, to insure self-hood. Therefore the goals of a

liberating education are simply "learning to learn", going beyond what

one has learned to think for oneself.[39]   For example, looking at fiction

as rhetoric implies a particular relationship between the techniques the

artist employs and the particular effects, specifically the moral effect,

he intends.   Surely a student of fiction will find Booth's questions about

techniques and moral qualities valuable beyond the use Booth himself makes

of them.

In the context of this general definition of the purposes and

application of literary criticism one may approach the question which

implies my conclusion: specifically, what is the value of Crane's critical

theory as it is expanded and developed to its full potential in Booth's

The Rhetoric of Fiction?

CONCLUSION

In the first place Crane's process of analysis of the critical framework is a useful method of evaluating the criticism of critics. More important than the expertise of any practical judgements a critic may make are the implicit assumptions about critical method upon which such judgements are made. Consequently, the value of any critical system may be assessed in terms of the kinds of questions it allows or excludes, according to its conception of critical method. Crane applies this analytical principle in his devastating attack on Richards' method of interpretation and Brooks' critical monism. Unfortunately, he makes only a weak attempt to evaluate the dialectic and constructive criticism of John Crowe Ransom. Crane recognizes that although Ransom is a 'dialectic' critic in the sense that he "retains the basic oppositions afforded by the model," he is constructive rather than reductive in his procedure in that he shows that these oppositions "are inevitably particularized and qualified as they manifest themselves in more differentiated forms" (Languages, 24). The particular advantage of Ransom's system seems to be that he can apply an integrating philosophical scheme to a work without violating the individuality of the work. Ransom demonstrates an improvement over both the criticism of Richards and Brooks, which tends to violate the particularity of the work, and the criticism of Crane, which preserves the particularity of the work but provides no general basis for comparative judgements. Nor does Crane adequately treat a critic

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like Mathew Arnold whose critical theory deals with qualities, 'serious-
ness' and 'magnitude', rather than technique and structure. Arnold's
greatness seems to lie in his ability to evoke such standards that are
so difficult to articulate; however, this does not rule out the possibility
of defining his critical framework and attempting to determine its value
by asking what kind of questions Arnold is suited to deal with and what
kind of questions his framework excludes.

The concept of critical frameworks or 'languages' leads Crane
from a recognition of the multiplicity of critical languages to a plural-
istic and instrumental view of criticism. This approach to criticism
encourages independence from any one critical system, flexibility and
self-criticism, attitudes which are valuable to the literary critic.

Thirdly, Crane derives from Aristotle what seems to me a very
useful concept of the structural relations of a work and a method for
getting at those structural relations. The method is 'matter of fact'
rather than abstract, constructive rather than reductive, differentiating
rather than dialectic, functional rather than merely descriptive, and has
the particular advantage of preserving the individuality of a work. The
particular principle implied is that our discussion of any of the iden-
tifiable parts of the work is incomplete until we can understand these
parts in relation to the work as a whole. Crane's discussion of the
functional relations of the parts to the whole leads him into a hierar-
chical definition of these relations. Plot is defined as the primary
principle of order, then character, then thought and diction. Although
the analysis of the work is not complete until each of the ordering prin-
ciples has been discussed in relations to each other, Crane's process of

structural analysis does emphasise the non-verbal principles of drama and the novel. Admittedly this process of structural analysis from character and event down to style and diction reverses the order of the way we experience a literary work. Perhaps the dichotomy between analysis and experience is inherent in the academic discipline of literary criticism, but in Crane this dichotomy is stressed, not compensated for, and in critics less sensitive than Booth, can lead to sterile and formal analysis.

Fourthly, Crane is correct in identifying the structure as the forming principle which rationally orders the parts of the whole, and in repudiating the concept that structure is 'organic', that is, somehow inherent in either the language or the subject matter. Crane does not fail to recognize that there are inherent limitations in language and subject matter, even though he fails to apply this recognition to a comparison of literary forms of the kind Winters suggests. Crane's argument is simply that the principles of form (limitations, rather) in the language or subject matter are too general to apply with any sufficient degree of discrimination to the particular formal structure of an individual work. Yet Crane does not, I think, make the radical separation between form and meaning that Wimsatt accuses him of -- "None of the critics attacked by the Chicago critics would come even close to admitting the split between form and intelligence and feeling which Crane so clearly subscribes to" (Wimsatt, 52). The reason is that in Crane's analysis the principle of form is not separated from the effect. Crane's principles of structure maintain the literary integrity of the particular work without cutting it off formalistically from the human and life interests literature attempts to serve. This quality is admirably demonstrated in Booth's discussion of

practical interests and beliefs which leads him to a judgement of the moral effect of literary technique.

However, at this point there is an important difference between Crane and Booth. Crane's emphasis on the structural principles and his consequent definition of the end of poetry as simply "the perfecting of the poem as a beautiful or intrinsically excellent thing" (Languages, 155), leads to a criticism better suited to appreciation than evaluation. Crane's interdependent principles of the autonomy of the work and the appreciation of the work exclude any basis of comparative evaluation. Booth's discussion of the effects of the work does not violate the autonomy of the work nor is it inconsistent with, but arises out of our understanding of what Crane would call the formal principle of the work. But the discussion of the interest and beliefs which the artist forms does lead to evaluation of the effects. Crane's critical principles do potentially lead from analysis of form to discussion of interest and beliefs, from appreciation to evaluation but that potentiality is actualized only by Ronald Crane's most talented disciple, Wayne Booth.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Winters, The Function of Reason, 22. All subsequent references to this article will be indicated by Winters.

[2] Crane, "History versus Criticism in the Study of Literature," English Journal, XXIV (1935), 645-67. Later printed in Humanities, II, 3-24. All subsequent references will be indicated by Humanities.

[3] Lowes, "The Modern Language Association and Humane Scholarship," PMLA, XLVIII (1933), 1399-1408.

[4] Ransom, The World's Body, 330.

[5] Crane, Critics and Criticism, 22. All subsequent references to this book will be indicated by Critics.

[6] Jenkins, "Every Man His Own Critic", Carlton Miscellany, VIII, 100-106.

[7] This article was later published in Critics and Criticism, 27-45. All subsequent references to this article will be indicated by Critics.

[8] This article was later published in Critics and Criticism, 83-107. All subsequent references to this article will be indicated by Critics.

[9] Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism, ed. T.M. Raysor (London, 1930), II, 66-67. Cited in Critics, 88.

[10] Crane, Languages of Criticism, 9. All subsequent references to this book will be indicated by Languages.

These internal criteria may be briefly described as those minimal standards of academic workmanship which one has a right to expect in any reasoned discourse. First, we have a right to hold the critic "to the accepted canons of reasoning and hypothesis-making". Second, we have a right to assume that "theories [are] applicable to poems in ways that require some sort of verification in terms of what was actually put into the poems by their poets." The first step towards this verification is philological; the second is simply the principle that "any hypothesis must be verifiable by the reader in terms of evidence which he can examine for himself by means of his ordinary faculties supplemented by the relevant information". In particular Crane denies the validity of those readings which demand that the reader disregards his "natural emotional response to the poem" when he reads it "naively without the benefit of the critic's hypothesis." The fault is the hypothesis, not the reader's response. (Languages, 32-34)

[11] Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon, 41-65. All subsequent references to this article will be indicated by Wimsatt.

[12] Quoted from Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals il. 640^b25-59; Metaphysics vii, 17. 1041^b5-8. Cited by Crane, Languages, 150.

[13] These three articles are found together under the title "Two Essays in Practical Criticism". University Review, VIII (Spring, 1942), 199-219. All subsequent references to these articles will be indicated University Review.

[14] Legouis, Wordsworth in a New Light. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1923), 38, cited by Maclean, University Review, 204.

[15] Trowbridge, "Aristotle and the New Criticism," 537-55.

[16] Ransom, "The Basis of Criticism", 556-71.

[17] Admittedly, the body of Crane's practical criticism is very limited. Besides the essay on Tom Jones there is an extended footnote on Grey's Elegy from "The Critical Monism of Cleanth Brooks" (Critics, 99 see footnote 35), later expanded in Languages, see 175-76. Also included in Languages is an illustrative analysis of the plot of Macbeth (see 169-174). Crane's footnote to his analysis of Macbeth is particularly significant; it refers to an article by Wayne C. Booth, "Macbeth as Tragic Hero" in Journal of General Education, VI, (October, 1951), 21-25. Crane's footnote refernce hardly seems acknowledgment enough, for Crane has clearly borrowed heavily from Booth, the only advance being that Crane has abstracted and elucidated the principles implicit in Booth's argument. This distinct impression is noteworthy, particularly in the light of the relationship between Crane's critical theory and Booth's practical criticism which I shall attempt to establish later.

The rest of Crane's practical criticism is collected in volume II of The Idea of the Humanities. Most significant among these essays are two examples of critical and historical analysis. In "Suggestions Towards a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling'", Crane traces the antecedent attitudes forward from the seventeenth century to Mckenzie's life-time, yet fails to evolve this history of ideas into a discussion of the novel itself. The essay "The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos and the History of Ideas" effectively illustrates the critical principle of 'the minimum hypotheses', but is a curiously ineffective account of the particular power of Book IV of Gulliver's Travels. It is the particular character of these two essays, that Crane appears to be more interested in the theoretical point he has set out to make than a practical criticism of the work itself.

Clearly the best essay in the collection is Crane's discussion of Jane Austen's Persuasion. Crane stresses the purely artistic problems and alternatives faced by Jane Austen in working out the narrative strategy in terms of characters and events. There are two more examples of criticism of this kind, a letter written to a colleague on Hemingway's "The Killers"

and a second letter, later published outside of The Idea of the Humanities, an analysis of Hemingway's "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber". Both are at least adequate examples of practical criticism.

[18]Crane discusses the implications of the empirical and indictive character of his system in Languages:

"We can never know in advance all the possibilities, and we can never, consequently form a hypothesis about a work of any artistic complexity or even about many simpler works without making a shorter or longer inductive leap from the words and sentences before us to the peculiar combination of universals which define their poetic form. And that is why, in this mode of criticism, we can make no separation except analytically between theory and application, the latter being possible only if the former already exists at least up to a certain point and the former being constantly refined and enlarged as we proceed with the latter." (Languages, 177)

[19]Clearly the value of the hypothesis depends upon the extent to which the implied formal necessities and the perceived and felt particulars of the work for which the hypothesis is constructed can be seen to fit together; therefore the successful application of any hypothesis implies at least two general conditions:

> first, our ability to keep our explanatory formulae fluid
> and to submit them to constant revisions in principle or in
> detail before we transform them into conclusions; and, second,
> our willingness to use systematically what has been called
> "the method of multiple working hypotheses" (Languages, 177).

The concept of multiple working hypotheses is later developed in two essays incorporated in The Idea of the Humanities, "On Hypothesis in 'Historical Criticism'" (II, 236-60) and "The Teaching of Literary Texts" (II, 176-93). The concept of multiple working hypotheses is contrasted with 'the doctrine of the privileged hypothesis', "... the assumption that certain hypotheses, or kinds of hypotheses, contain in themselves, by virtue of their nature or origin and quite apart from the immediate facts of the case, a greater likelihood of proving correct than other hypotheses" (Humanities, II, 238); and secondly, with the 'doctrine of the sufficiency of positive corroboration', in which "a hypothesis is thought to be 'confirmed' if particulars can be found within the text or outside of it which either harmonize with it or can be construed to harmonize with it" (Humanities, II, 241). As an alternative to these two hypotheses, neither of which will stand critical scrutiny, Crane proposes the doctrine of "multiple hypotheses":

> "... the principle that the value of any hypothesis is always
> relative, not merely to the particulars it is intended to
> explain, but to all the other variant hypotheses which the
> same particulars might suggest if we gave them a chance:
> the best hypothesis is simply the best among several possible
> hypotheses, relevant to the same question about the same work,
> with which we have actually compared it, and unless we make

such comparisons a regular part of our procedure we always
court the danger of missing either slightly or fully what
the facts really are" (Humanities, II, 192).

In addition to these two general rules, Crane applies several more
particular criteria. The first is the necessity of "so framing our
hypotheses that they are not descriptive formulae merely, but clearly
imply practical artistic consequences" (Languages, 177); the adequacy of
any hypothesis being the degree of precision with which one can infer from
it the functional relationship between the parts and the whole, and the
kind of practical problems which faced the artist as he attempted to
realize this formal relationship. The second particular criterion is
to achieve "an explanation and judgement in terms adapted as closely as
possible to the peculiar structure and power of the work before us"
(Languages, 178). The inadequacy of simple genre distinctions is
recognized in the application of this principle. Thirdly, one "must
aspire to completeness of explanation" (Languages, 178). Clearly none
of the parts of the whole can be excluded by the hypothesis, but since
completeness without coherence gains little, any hypothesis must also
aim at a "maximum of internal unity" (Languages, 179). This is the
fourth particular criterion. The final criterion is "the classic
criterion of economy: that hypothesis is the best, other things being
equal, which requires the fewest supplementary hypotheses to make it work,
or which entails the least amount of explaining away" (Languages, 179).

[20]Coleridge's Shakespearan Criticism, ed. T.M. Raysor (London,
1930), II, 66-67; cf. Biographia literaria, II, 9-10, cited Languages, 183.

[21]"... diction, though necessarily having a form of its own by
virtue of its rhythmical, syntactical and 'stylistic' figuration, is the
underlying matter which, as significant speech, at once makes possible
all the other 'parts' and is in turn, mediately or immediately, controlled
by them. The nature of the four elements [plot, character, thought,
diction] is such, in short, that although a critic in his analysis of
a given tragedy or epic may take any one of them as his primary object
of attention, he can make no adequate judgement of the poet's success
or failure with respect to it without bringing into his discussion all
the others to which it is related, directly or indirectly, either as
matter or form" (Critics, 618, n. 7).

[22]Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, 217. All subsequent references
to this book will be indicated by Rhetoric.

[23]See S.N. Grebstein, Perspectives in Contemporary Criticism,
his introduction to a collection of essays representing the formalist
school of criticism, 81.

[24]Wright, "Man in Charge", Kenyon Rev., XXIV, 566.

[25]Reiman, SAQ, LXI, 427.

[26] Lodge, _MLR_, LVII, 580.

[27] Pizer, "Booth's _Rhetoric of Fiction_: Five Years Later," _CE_, XXIX, 473. All subsequent references to this article will be indicated by Pizer.

[28] Booth, _Now Don't Try to Reason With Me_, 114, n. 2.

[29] _Rhetoric_, 169, italics mine; also compare with Booth's prefatory remark: "My goal is not to set everyone straight about my favorite novelists but rather to free both readers and novelists from the constraints of abstract rules about what novelists must do, by reminding them in a systematic way of what novelists have in fact done" (preface).

[30] Booth, "_The Rhetoric of Fiction_ and the 'Poetics' of Fictions" in his _Now Don't Try to Reason With Me_, 151-72. All subsequent references to this article will be indicated by "_The Rhetoric of Fiction_ and the 'Poetics' of Fictions."

[31] But I [Booth] did not [and would not now] surrender the insights that come when the work is viewed not as a formed object, eternally what it is, beautifully whole in its form, but as something designed, or at least suited to impose itself upon us (not, be it noted, to communicate _themes_ or _norms_, as Mr. Donald Pizer and many other readers have taken it, but _itself_). Study of what a work _is_, what it has been made to _be_, will yield "poetics," .... What the work is made to _do_ -- how it is designed to communicate itself -- will yield a rhetoric. The two differing aspects will not be incompatible if they are done well, since a work does what it does because of what it is, and vice versa. But they will start and end at different points, and they will certainly deal with different elements in different proportions along the way ("_The Rhetoric of Fiction_ and the 'Poetics' of Fictions," 163-64).

[32] Swiggart, "Mr. Booth's Quarrel with Fiction", _Sewanee Rev._, LXXI, 142-59. All subsequent references to this article will be indicated by Swiggart.

Peter Swiggart's criticism of Booth is precisely at this point: "the concept of Rhetoric (in the Preface) is useless, not because fiction is unrhetorical, but because such a vague definition permits any fictional element to be called rhetorical" (144). But as he demonstrates again and again throughout his article, Swiggart has a unique way of getting at the particular issue while completely misunderstanding it. A work of art is many things, and while it is never _one_ thing, as Swiggart points out, to look at it _as if_ it were one thing, to look at it from a particular critical perspective, can yield a particular and unique discrimination.

[33] Booth makes three important bibliographical notations which support the point of view that the aesthetic basis of fiction is character and event:

Mudrick, Marvin. "Character and Event in Fiction," Yale Review, L (Winter, 1961), 202-18.
"The unit of fiction is the event," not the word or poetic phrase.

Rahv, Philip. "Fiction and the Criticism of Fiction," Kenyon Review, XVIII (Spring, 1956), 276-99.

Baker, Joseph E. "Aesthetic Surface in the Novel," The Trollopian, II (September, 1947), 91-106.
"The 'aesthetic surface' of fiction is found, not in words, but in the 'world' of character, event and value 'concretely represented and temporarily arranged'" (100).

[34]Killham, "The 'Second Self' in Novel Criticism", British Journal of Aesthetics, VI, 182-99.

It is at this point that Killham offers his criticism of Booth ("The 'Second Self' in Novel Criticism"). "The 'second self' expresses the notion that a work of art does not exhibit style (as a linguistic product of the writer's attitude to his subject) but has a more intimately personal connexion" (185). However, Killham's subsequent argument that the notion of style cannot be incorporated within the notion of the 'second self' depends upon the confusion of Booth's distinctions between the author, the supposed teller, and the literary character and upon the dogmatic assertion that "No novel can be considered rhetorical, for rhetoric is inimical to the freedom within the law a life like impression demands (199). Booth has effectively refuted Killham's criticism in his article "The Rhetoric of Fiction and the 'Poetics' of Fictions", 155-58.

[35]Wimsatt and Beardsley, "The Affective Fallacy", The Verbal Icon, 21.

[36]I think it is clear from the pattern of Booth's argument in The Rhetoric of Fiction that the image the implied author creates of himself is the most important evaluative principle in his critical language. This is confirmed in the concluding chapter:

> "In short, the writer should worry less about whether his narrators are realistic than about whether the image he creates of himself, his implied author, is one that his most intelligent and perceptive readers can admire" Rhetoric, 395).

[37]At this point Booth admits that the nature of his polemic in defense of direct commentary rules out an adequate discussion of the devices of indirect evaluation; however, such a study does have relevance to the question of the rhetoric of fiction. See Rhetoric, 272-73.

[38]Leavis, Anna Karenina, 196.

[39]Booth, The Knowledge Most Worth Having, 21-22.

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